Supreme Court, U.S.
FILED

10-633 NOV 5 - 2010

OFFICE OF THE CLERK

No.

In The
Supreme Court of the United States

In re WILLIAM M. WINDSOR

WILLIAM M. WINDSOR,

Petitioner

v.

Judge Joel F. Dubina, Judge Rosemary Barkett, Judge Edward Earl Carnes, Judge James Larry Edmondson, Judge Frank M. Hull, Judge Stanley Marcus, Judge William H. Pryor, Jr., Judge Gerald Bard Tjoflat, Judge Beverly B. Martin, Judge Susan H. Black, Judge Charles R. Wilson, Judge James C. Hill, Judge Peter T. Fay, Judge Phyllis A. Kravitch, Judge R. Lanier Anderson, and Judge Emmett Ripley Cox

Respondents

On Petition for Writ of Mandamus
To The United States Court of Appeals for The Eleventh Circuit

PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS

William M. Windsor
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QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Windsor is seeking a Petition for Writ of Mandamus to disqualify all judges in the Eleventh Circuit from presiding in any civil actions involving Windsor. Windsor seeks this relief pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 20 as authorized by 28 U.S.C.§1651(a).

1. Whether the judges of the Eleventh Circuit could be expected to have an extra-judicial bias for their fellow judges.

2. Whether the judges of the Eleventh Circuit could be expected to have an extra-judicial bias against pro se parties.

3. Whether federal judges in the Eleventh Circuit should be stopped from committing illegal and corrupt acts to obstruct justice and inflict bias on litigants.

4. Whether the judges of the Eleventh Circuit could be expected to have a bias against Windsor.

5. Whether the average reasonable person knowing all the facts could doubt that judges of the Eleventh Circuit might be expected to have a bias against Windsor.

6. Whether rulings of the Eleventh Circuit ion extra-judicial bias conflict with the precedent of The Supreme Court.

7. Whether anyone in the federal judiciary cares about honesty, decency, perjury, subornation of perjury, fraud upon the courts, and crimes committed by federal judges from the bench.

8. Whether The Supreme Court is prepared to declare that the Constitution and its amendments must no longer be void in the Eleventh Circuit.

9. Whether The Supreme Court will not be afraid to disclose the corruption in the federal courts.

CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

Pursuant to Rule 29.6 Petitioner states the following:

This petition is filed on behalf of an individual.

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OPINIONS BELOW

The opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit are provided in the Appendix to the Petition ("Pet.App.") on pages 2 to 62. Orders denying disqualification of judges are on Pet.App. pages 13,15,18,22,26,29,33,35,43, and 45.

JURISDICTION

This Court is authorized to issue a Writ of Mandamus pursuant to 28 U.S.C.§1651(a) in aid of its respective jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.§1254.

STATUTES INVOLVED

This case involves 28 U.S.C.§144, 28 U.S.C.§455, the United States Constitution and the First, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, the Code of Judicial Conduct, and the Court's Inherent Powers.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Jurisdiction Below

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia has subject matter jurisdiction over Civil Action No.1:06-CV-0714-ODE ("MIST-1"), Civil Action No.1:09-CV-02027-WSD (MIST-2"), and Civil Action No.1:09-CV-01543-WSD ("Deposition_Action") pursuant to 28 U.S.C.§1331, which confers original jurisdiction for actions arising under the laws of the United States and 28 U.S.C.§1367, which confers jurisdiction ancillary to this District Court's original exercise of jurisdiction in these civil actions.[1]

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit had jurisdiction pursuant to the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C.§1651(a).

B. Statement of Facts

This is a request for a writ of mandamus to be issued by this Court directing that all judges in the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit ("11th Judges"), be disqualified from presiding in any civil action involving Windsor.

In MIST-1, four Maid managers comimitted hundreds of counts of perjury and committed a conspiracy to commit fraud. (See MIST-1 Doc.377.)

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[1] Citations are provided herein to three dockets. All documents referenced herein are incorporated as if attached hereto.

Maid's managers and attorney, Mr. Carl Hugo Anderson, lied many hundreds of times. (See MIST-1_Doc.377–Exhibits_1-8,10-21 for each false statement and the proof of the falsity.)

Proof of wrongdoing is conclusive in the Docket of MIST-1 and MIST-2_Doc.1.[2] The many issues of professional misconduct are detailed in MIST-1_Doc.474 and Dec#25 (MIST-1_Doc.462).

Judges are supposed to tell the truth at all times, but Judge Evans has made false statements routinely. Proof of the false statements in the orders has been documented in MIST-1_Doc.362 and 377 with citations to Maid's witnesses proving that many statements are false.[3]

These were material false statements made under the Judge's oath of office in a federal proceeding. Judge Evans knew statements that she made were false.[4]

Judge Evans has committed obstruction of justice by withholding material evidence that should have been provided to Windsor. Judge Evans received two contracts for an in camera inspection in February 2007. Judge Evans claimed the contracts were not relevant to the case, but that was false.

Windsor finally obtained the contracts through a FOIL request in 2009, so the Petitioner

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[2] See MIST-1_Doc.474.

[3] MIST-1_Doc.377, Exhibits 9 and 22.

[4] MIST-1_Doc.174, P23: 24-25, P24: 1-7, P34: 4-7, P44: 6-8.

knows that the contracts contained extremely important information, and the Petitioner is convinced that Maid filed bogus documents with Judge Evans. (Petitioner has filed a Motion to Compel Production for In Camera Inspection with this Court. These documents from the MIST-1 files in the Northern District of Georgia will prove fraud upon the courts and obstruction of justice.)

Judge Evans has been pervasively biased and has committed crimes while operating corruptly throughout MIST-1.

Detailed background facts regarding the professional misconduct of Judge Evans are provided in Dec#23.[5] Dec#23 details what Judge Evans did throughout this case. Other violations are detailed in Dec#25.[6]

Windsor has filed a Petition for Writ of Mandamus with this Court to disqualify Judge Duffey. A similar Petition to disqualify Judge Evans is at the printer and will follow the filing of this Petition within a few days. Windsor asks that all of these Petitions be considered jointly as they provide the complete picture of judicial bias.

The worst of hardships have resulted from the dishonesty in this case. Windsor has lost approximately $1,500,000.00, have been saddled with an injunction that is a violation of Georgia law, have been defamed, and have lost years of man

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[5] MIST-1_Doc.406.
[6] MIST-1_Doc.462.

hours fighting the injustice. To the Petitioner, the financial cost represents money that this retiree expected to live on in retirement.[7]

Judge Duffey ignored all of the above when it was spelled out for him in precise detail in MIST-2. Details of the earliest wrongs ignored by Judge Duffey are provided in MIST2-Doc.1. There has been much more since these were written.

The judges of the Eleventh Circuit have similarly ignored all of the wrongdoing while violating statutes, rules, the Code of Judicial Conduct, and the Constitution to damage Windsor and protect Judge Evans and Judge Duffey.

In denying a Motion to Recuse, Judge Duffey stated that extrajudicial bias is required for recusal. On the Petition for Writ of Mandamus, the Eleventh Circuit also ruled: "Windsor has not shown bias stemming from an extra judicial source." But Judge Duffey's bias IS extrajudicial as is the bias of Judge Evans and the judges of the Eleventh Circuit.

The facts stated above are uncontroverted. No one has submitted a sworn affidavit in any court proceeding to even attempt to dispute these facts. The record in MIST-1 contains proof citing to the record, primarily the sworn testimony of Maid's managers.

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[7] MIST-2_Doc.1.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

I. THE JUDGES OF THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT HAVE A BIAS FOR THEIR FELLOW JUDGES.

A reasonable person would question the impartiality of any judge in litigation involving another judge who has been a friend for as long as 32 years.

Judge Evans has been a federal judge since 1978. She has been a federal judge in Atlanta longer than all 11 of the active federal judges at the Eleventh Circuit. Judge Edmondson--1986, Judge Dubina--1990, Judge Carnes--1992, Judge Black--1992, Judge Barkett--1994, Judge Hull--1997, Judge Marcus--1997, Judge Wilson--1999, Judge Pryor--2005, and Judge Martin--2010. Only Judge Tjoflat has been a federal judge longer – 1975, but he joined the Eleventh Circuit three years after Judge Evans became an Atlanta federal judge. Two Senior Judges have slightly more seniority: Judge Hill--1976, Judge Fay--1976, Judge Kravitch--1979, Judge Anderson--1981, Judge Cox--1988. The number of years that each of the Eleventh Circuit Judges have been friends with Judge Evans are: 24, 20, 18, 18, 16, 13, 13, 5, 1, 29, 32, 32, 31, 29, and 22.

The federal judges in the Northern District of Georgia and the Eleventh Circuit recently established a precedent regarding recusal in cases involving a friend judge. Every federal judge disqualified himself or herself in Criminal Action No. 1:10-MJ-141S involving federal judge Jack T. Camp,

accused of drug and gun violations. Chief Judge Dubina petitioned the Chief Justice of this Court to appoint a judge from another circuit, and he did. Windsor has filed motions in this regard, but they have been ignored.

II. JUDGES OF THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT HAVE A BIAS AGAINST PRO SE PARTIES.

While the prejudice FOR their fellow judges is bad enough, the judges of the Eleventh Circuit also have a bias against pro se parties. Pro se parties are mistreated. There is a presumption of "guilt," legal incompetence, and that the judges can get away with whatever they choose to do to a pro se party. There is a presumption that pro se parties will be similarly mistreated at every level of the judicial process. The Eleventh Circuit judges employ a different set of rules for pro se parties. Pro se parties have their legal rights curtailed.

While the prejudice against pro se parties may have come from experience as a judge or as an attorney, this prejudice did not emanate from in-courtroom experience with the pro se party. The bias against pro se parties is clearly extra-judicial. Windsor has had his rights violated by the prejudice these judges have against him as a pro se party. Extra-judicial bias is grounds for disqualification pursuant to 28 U.S.C.455.

III. JUDGES OF THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT VIOLATE THE RULES, IGNORE THE

FACTS, VIOLATE THE LAW, AND OBSTRUCT JUSTICE.

The Petitioner believes Federal Judges Orinda D. Evans ("Judge Evans"), William S. Duffey, Jr. ("Judge Duffey"), Joel F. Dubina ("Judge Dubina"), James Larry Edmondson ("Judge Edmondson"), Rosemary Barkett ("Judge Barkett"), Edward Earl Carnes ("Judge Carnes"), Frank M. Hull ("Judge Hull"), Stanley Marcus ("Judge Marcus"), and William H. Pryor, Jr. ("Judge Pryor") (jointly "Defendant Judges") are corrupt and have conspired to damage Windsor. Windsor has filed a civil action against these judges in the Northern District of Georgia.[8]

The Defendant Judges have ignored Windsor's uncontroverted proof of massive dishonesty in MIST-1.

The actions of the Defendant Judges support perjury, subornation of perjury, Rule 11 violations, obstruction of justice, dishonest parties, dishonest attorneys, and corrupt judges.

By failing to follow proper procedure, the Defendant Judges violated Windsor's civil rights as they have been acting in the absence of all jurisdiction.

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[8] Windsor is TRYING to get his lawsuit filed. The Clerk of the Court has not assigned a civil action number and has not submitted the case to a judge for the emergency TRO hearing that Windsor requested weeks ago.

Examples of the wrongdoing by the Judges of the Eleventh Circuit are illustrated in the Pet.App. as highlighted below:

ALLOW THE DISTRICT COURT JUDGES TO GET AWAY WITH THEIR IMPROPER AND ILLEGAL ACTS

Proof of this is throughout the Pet.App. pp.2-62.

IGNORE THE FACTS

Judges Dubina, Hull, and Fay completely ignored the facts presented by the Defendants, which were proven by the record before the courts. (Pet.App.6.)

Judges Hull, Marcus, and Pryor completely ignored the facts and sanctioned perjury by Maid's Attorneys.(Pet.App.20.)

Judges Edmondson and Birch did not address a single fact in denying a petition for writ of mandamus. In so doing, they took the position that sworn affidavits under penalty of perjury and a mountain of proof of crimes and wrongdoing by Maid, Maid's Attorneys, and Judge Evans was not worthy of their time. Their order sanctions perjury and obstruction of justice.(Pet.App.22.)(Docket in Appeal No.09-15232-D.)

Judges Carnes, Barkett, and Hull ignored all of the facts and law. Their decision in Pet.App.26 says that if a corporation or LLC is unable to find an attorney who will represent them in a lawsuit against

a judge, that corporation loses all legal rights. They ignored this very important issue. (Pet.App.26.)(Dockets in Appeal Nos.09-14735-DD,09-16493, and 09-16494.)

Judges Carnes, Barkett, and Hull ignored everything and issued two of the most outlandish orders ever in Appeal No. 09-14735-DD. (Pet.App.29_and_40.) They ignored the facts and the law. They dismissed an appeal as frivolous with no explanation whatsoever. They lied about the basis for the bias that Windsor swore was why the judges of the Eleventh Circuit should be recused in matters involving Judge Evans and Judge Duffey. They granted sanctions against Windsor and to Maid in an appeal that did not even involve Maid, where the district court found nothing frivolous, where the facts and the law and case law indicate that the appeal was totally proper and sanctions were totally improper. And after all that, they violated Windsor's Constitutional rights even more severely in Pet.App.40.(Pet.App.29.)(Docket in Appeal No.09-14735-DD.)

Windsor needs to add Judges Black and Wilson to his lawsuit after reviewing their order of April 14, 2010. (Pet.App.35.) This is a horrible order in which they demonstrate bias by making absolutely false statements obtained from their fellow judges. They cite erroneous law while ignoring the case law that proves that mandamus is the proper vehicle for recusal. Their order does not discuss a single one of Windsor's points in an appeal where the law and the facts are absolutely overwhelming against Judge Evans' order. The only finding in the five page order

(padded mercilessly) is "After review, we find that Petitioner has failed to carry his burden both...." This clearly violates ***Corcoran v. Levenhagen***, 558 U. S. ____ (2009). Judges Black and Wilson then trample all over Windsor's legal and Constitutional rights by placing filing restrictions on Windsor. This was done in violation of the case law that says such restrictions may not be placed without notice and an opportunity to be heard. The restrictions are totally unfounded because Windsor has filed nothing even remotely frivolous. (Pet.App.35.)(Appeal Nos.10-10698-A,10-10699-A,10-10700-A,10-10701-A.) Windsor would like to note that somehow three of his petitions for mandamus were somehow duplicated. The Clerk of the Court never responded to Windsor's requests to try to figure out what happened. Windsor also believes that one action was ruled on twice (same bad result each time). Windsor would never intentionally pursue the same issue in the same way more than once.

Judges Carnes, Barkett, and Hull ignored everything and issued two of the most outlandish orders ever in Appeal No.09-14735-DD. (Pet.App.29_and_40.) In Pet.App.40, they literally ignored absolutely everything. They illegally and maliciously claimed that Windsor exceeded the page limits that do not exist in FRAP 38. They ignored and never even ruled on motions that pertained to the same issue and preceded this refusal to even allow Windsor's response to be filed. After it was file stamped by the Clerk, it was returned over a month later with the file stamp scratched out. Judges Carnes, Barkett, and Hull granted sanctions against Windsor and to Maid in an appeal that Windsor

should have won hands-down. To add insult to injury, they never issued a judgment, and their order gave no direction to the Clerk of the Court to issue a writ of execution, but the Clerk did both. Maid has filed liens on all of Windsor's assets and those of his wife, and Windsor is suing the Clerk of the Court over the wrongful actions. To just add a little more violation of Windsor's rights to due process, they ordered that Windsor could not file a motion for reconsideration or any motion of any type in this matter ever. Judges Carnes, Barkett, and Hull need to be high on Congressional list of the Atlanta federal judges to be impeached.(Pet.App.40.)(Docket in Appeal No.09-14735-DD.)

Judges Carnes, Barkett, and Hull struck again in Pet.App.43. They lied about the basis for the bias that Windsor swore was why the judges of the Eleventh Circuit should be recused in matters involving Judge Evans and Judge Duffey. They cited erroneous case law and ignored the Supreme Court's order in ***Liteky***. Then the further trampled Windsor's rights by ordering that Windsor could not respond to the denial and its perjury.(Pet.App.43.)(Dockets in Appeal Nos.09-16448-A,09-16493-A, and 09-16494-A.)

Windsor has been blocked from seeking reconsideration of orders or petitioning for rehearing en banc. This keeps Windsor from reaching the honest judges at the Eleventh Circuit.(Pet.App.50.)

Judges Carnes, Hull, and Marcus ignored everything in Appeal No.10-12517-A.(Pet.App.55.) They ignored the facts. They ignored the law. They dismissed as frivolous with no explanation

whatsoever. There is nothing whatsoever frivolous about the appeal; it covers similar issues to appeals ruled not frivolous. The law is crystal clear that Judge Evans violated the law.(Pet.App.55.)(Docket in Appeal No.10-12517-A.)

Judges Edmondson, Birch, and Wilson ignored everything in Appeal Nos. 10-12450-A. (Pet.App.57.) They ignored the facts. They ignored the law. They dismissed as frivolous with no explanation whatsoever. There is nothing whatsoever frivolous about the appeal; it covers identical issues to appeals ruled not frivolous. The law is crystal clear that Judge Evans violated the law. Significant case law was cited by Windsor. (Pet.App.57.)(Docket in Appeal No.10-12450-A.)

IGNORE THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL AND APPELLATE PROCEDURE

Judges Dubina, Hull, and Fay ignored the various rules that were violated by the Plaintiffs. (Pet.App.6.)

Judges Hull, Marcus, and Pryor had no trouble illegally ordering sanctions against Windsor (Pet.App.29_and_40), but they completely ignored the many violations of Maid's Attorneys in MIST-2. On page 19,¶2 of Appellees' Brief, Appellees state: "...he [Windsor] ... testified that he sold consumers worthless vouchers as part of his campaign to injure Maid." Windsor stated in his Motion for Sanctions in Appeal No. 09-13998-A: "This is false and despicable. The Appellees are all extremely dishonest, and this statement is a whopper of a lie.

Appellees know this is false. This statement was made to deceive this Court and damage Windsor. If this Court believes this statement, Windsor will be damaged. This is FRAUD – fraud upon the court. This is PERJURY. There is no factual basis whatsoever for this statement. Exhibit J hereto are pages from the deposition cited by Appellees on Page 19 of their Brief. See Exhibit J, P76:11-15, P91, 92, 93. Exhibit C hereto provides Maid's 30(b)(6) testimony that Windsor did not do what Appellees claim. Seventeen (17) sentences in Appellees' Brief are false." Windsor cited the proof, and his sworn affidavit under penalty of perjury was not controverted.(Pet.App.20.)

Judges Carnes, Barkett, and Hull ignored FRAP 38 and every provision that requires due process as well as everything to do with fairness and decency in Pet.App.40. They ignored and never even ruled on motions that pertained to the same issue and preceded this refusal to even allow Windsor's response to be filed in violation of a wide variety of rules. After it was file stamped by the Clerk, it was returned over a month later with the file stamp scratched out. To add insult to injury, they never issued a judgment as is required by the Rules, and their order gave no direction to the Clerk of the Court to issue a writ of execution, but the Clerk did both. Windsor tried to get the Eleventh Circuit to do something about this, but Judges Carnes, Barkett, and Hull ordered the Clerk to return anything and everything presented by Windsor.(Pet.App.40 and Docket in Appeal No.09-14735-DD.)

Windsor has been blocked from seeking reconsideration of orders or petitioning for rehearing en banc. This keeps Windsor from reaching the honest judges at the Eleventh Circuit.(Pet.App.50.)

Judges Carnes, Hull, and Marcus ignored everything in Appeal Nos. 10-12517-A.(Pet.App.55.) They ignored the facts. They ignored the law. They dismissed as frivolous with no explanation whatsoever. There is nothing whatsoever frivolous about the appeal; it covers similar issues to appeals ruled not frivolous. The law is crystal clear that Judge Evans violated the law. (Pet.App.55.)(Docket in Appeal No.10-12517-A.)

Judges Edmondson, Birch, and Wilson ignored everything in Appeal Nos. 10-12450-A.(Pet.App.57.) They ignored the facts. They ignored the law. They dismissed as frivolous with no explanation whatsoever. The law is crystal clear that Judge Evans violated the law. Significant case law was cited by Windsor. (Pet.App.57.)(Docket in Appeal No.10-12450-A.)

IGNORE THE POINTS OF ERROR OF APPELLANTS

Judges Dubina, Hull, and Fay ignored all but one. They did not address 12 significant points of error and gave no justification whatsoever for the decision. (Pet.App.6.)

Judges Edmondson and Birch did not address a single point of the 19 Issues Presented by Windsor in

denying a petition for writ of mandamus. (Pet.App.22.)(Docket in Appeal No.09-15232-D.)

Judges Black and Wilson completely and totally ignored Windsor's absolutely valid issues. (Pet.App.35.) Their order does not discuss a single one of Windsor's points in an appeal where the law and the facts are absolutely overwhelming against Judge Evans' order. (Pet.App.35.)(Appeal Nos.10-10698-A,10-10699-A,10-10700-A, and 10-10701-A.)

Judges Carnes, Barkett, and Hull ignored everything and issued sanctions against Windsor and to Maid in an appeal that Windsor should have won hands-down. Windsor's Appellant's Brief cited 35 cases, 18 statutes, 13 Rules, and several Constitutional provisions. Whether Judge Duffey erred by allowing Judge Evans to file a Motion to Quash Subpoena and create this civil action. Judges Carnes, Barkett, and Hull completely and totally igniored the following: ignored Whether Judge Duffey erred by demonstrating pervasive bias against Windsor; Whether Judge Duffey erred by making false statements in orders; Whether Judge Duffey erred by encouraging perjury, subornation of perjury, Rule 11 violations, obstruction of justice, dishonest Plaintiffs, dishonest Plaintiffs' Attorneys, and dishonest Judge Evans; Whether Judge Duffey erred by making fact decisions contrary to the facts that were before the court; Whether Judge Duffey erred by commiting perjury; Whether Judge Duffey erred by issuing orders without legal justification; Whether Judge Duffey erred by claiming Windsor did not cite errors of law that would justify reconsideration on the Court's orders; Whether

Judge Duffey erred by claiming Windsor did not cite errors of fact that would justify reconsideration on the Court's orders; Whether Judge Duffey erred by violating Windsor's Constitutional rights; Whether Judge Duffey erred by failing to report Judge Evans to the appropriate authorities for violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct; Whether Judge Duffey erred by failing to report Plaintiffs' Attorneys to the appropriate authorities for violations of the State Bar of Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct; Whether Judge Duffey erred by failing to provide valid legal justification when denying Motion for Change of Venue.(Pet.App.40.)(Docket in Appeal No.09-14735-DD.)

IGNORE THE LAW

Judges Dubina, Hull, and Fay ignored perhaps the single most clear law there is – that there cannot be summary judgment if there is a key disputed fact issue, which there absolutely was. In MIST-1, the key issue was whether there was an oral contract for six months in 2005. The Defendants provided sworn testimony in multiple affidavits and three depositions stating that there was an oral contract for the entire 2005 season that was provided by Sandra Carlson for the Plaintiffs. The only testimony or evidence for the Plaintiffs was that the President testified he was "not aware of a contract." Sandra Carlson failed to appear for multiple depositions and was not allowed to testify by affidavit. Judge Evans stated in two orders that the Defendants swore there was a contract "for the entire 2005 season," but in her Summary Judgment Order, she claimed the agreement was for "in the 2005 season," a statement that appears nowhere in the

record. Judges Dubina, Hull, and Fay ruled that there was no fact issue, and they affirmed summary judgment. This violates thousands upon thousands of cases.(Pet.App.6.)

Judges Tjoflat and Pryor ignored the letter of the law in 28 U.S.C.144. They quoted from ***Liteky v. United States***, but ignored the portion of ***Liteky*** that makes it crystal clear that matters arising out of judicial proceedings can be grounds for recusal, especially if it came from a previous case, as was the situation with Judge Duffey. Judges Tjoflat and Pryor have the ungodly audacity to claim that Judge Evans can call me "scurrilous and irresponsible, and reasonable people would not think that he might not be able to be impartial.(Pet.App.15-17.) (See the Petition for Writ of Mandamus to disqualify Judge William S. Duffey that was filed with this Court the first week in November 2010.)

Judges Hull, Marcus, and Pryor completely ignored the law and sanctioned perjury by Maid's Attorneys.(Pet.App.20.)

Judges Carnes, Barkett, and Hull regularly ignore the law (just as they ignore the facts). (Pet.App.26.)(Dockets in Appeal Nos.09-14735-DD, 09-16493, and 09-16494.)

Judges Carnes, Barkett, and Hull ignored everything and issued one of the most outlandish orders ever in Appeal No. 09-14735-DD.(Pet.App.29.) They ignored the facts. They ignored the law. (Pet.App.29.)(Docket in Appeal No.09-14735-DD.)

Judges Black and Wilson completely and totally ignored Windsor's absolutely valid issues. (Pet.App.35.) They cite erroneous law while ignoring the case law that proves that mandamus is the proper vehicle for recusal.(Pet.App.35.)(Appeal Nos.10-10698-A,10-10699-A,10-10700-A, and 10-10701-A.)

In Pet.App.40, Judges Carnes, Barkett, and Hull literally ignored absolutely everything. They illegally and maliciously claimed that Windsor exceeded the page limits that do not exist in FRAP 38. They ignored and never even ruled on motions that pertained to the same issue and preceded this refusal to even allow Windsor's response to be filed. After it was file stamped by the Clerk, it was returned over a month later with the file stamp scratched out. Judges Carnes, Barkett, and Hull granted sanctions against Windsor and to Maid in an appeal that Windsor should have won hands-down. To add insult to injury, they never issued a judgment, and their order gave no direction to the Clerk of the Court to issue a writ of execution, but the Clerk did both. Maid has filed liens on all of Windsor's assets and those of his wife, and Windsor is suing the Clerk of the Court over the wrongful actions. To just add a little more violation of Windsor's rights to due process, they ordered that Windsor could not file a motion for reconsideration or any motion of any type in this matter ever. Judges Carnes, Barkett, and Hull need to be high on Congressional list of the Atlanta federal judges to be impeached. (Pet.App.40.)(Docket in Appeal No.09-14735-DD.)

Judges Carnes, Barkett, and Hull struck again in Pet.App.43. They lied about the basis for the bias

that Windsor swore was why the judges of the Eleventh Circuit should be recused in matters involving Judge Evans and Judge Duffey. They cited erroneous case law and ignored the Supreme Court's order in ***Liteky***. Then the further trampled Windsor's rights by ordering that Windsor could not respond to the denial and its perjury.(Pet.App.43.)(Dockets in Appeal Nos.09-16448-A,09-16493-A, and 09-16494-A.)

Windsor has been blocked from seeking reconsideration of orders or petitioning for rehearing en banc. This keeps Windsor from reaching the honest judges at the Eleventh Circuit.(Pet.App.50.)

Judges Carnes, Hull, and Marcus ignored everything in Appeal No.10-12517-A.(Pet.App.55.) They ignored the facts. They ignored the law. They dismissed as frivolous with no explanation whatsoever. There is nothing whatsoever frivolous about the appeal; it covers similar issues to appeals ruled not frivolous. The law is crystal clear that Judge Evans violated the law.(Pet.App.55.)(Docket in Appeal No.10-12517-A.)

Judges Edmondson, Birch, and Wilson ignored everything in Appeal No.10-12450-A.(Pet.App.57.) They ignored the facts. They ignored the law. (Pet.App.57.)(Docket in Appeal No.10-12450-A.)

IGNORE APPLICABLE CASE LAW

In virtually all of the orders in the Pet.App., the judges ignored extensive case law cited. In not one single order did the judges of the Eleventh Circuit

ever indicate that any of my cited case law was in any way incorrect -- thousands of citations.

While Windsor has read many cases that cause him to feel that Judge Tjoflat is honest and an excellent judge, the decision of Judges Tjoflat and Pryor on Windsor's effort to recuse Judge Duffey is one of the worst. They ignored the letter of the law in 28 U.S.C.144. They quoted from ***Liteky v. United States***, but ignored the portion of ***Liteky*** that makes it crystal clear that matters arising out of judicial proceedings can be grounds for recusal, especially if it came from a previous case, as was the situation with Judge Duffey. Judges Tjoflat and Pryor have the ungodly audacity to claim that Judge Evans can call me "scurrilous and irresponsible, and reasonable people would not think that he might not be able to be impartial.(Pet.App.15-17.) (See the Petition for Writ of Mandamus to disqualify Judge William S. Duffey that was filed with this Court the first week in November 2010.)

Judges Carnes, Barkett, and Hull ignored the case law that says mandamus is the appropriate appellate action in matters of recusal.(Pet.App.26.) (Dockets in Appeal Nos. 09-14735-DD,09-16493, and 09-16494.)

Judges Carnes, Barkett, and Hull ignored everything and issued one of the most outlandish orders ever in Appeal No. 09-14735-DD.(Pet.App.29.) They ignored the facts. They ignored the case law. (Pet.App.29.)(Docket in Appeal No.09-14735-DD.)

Judges Tjoflat, Edmondson, and Burch ignored the case law that says mandamus is the appropriate appellate action in matters of recusal.(Pet.App.33.) (Docket in Appeal No.10-10349-A.)

Judges Black and Wilson completely and totally ignored Windsor's absolutely valid issues. (Pet.App.35.) They cite erroneous law while ignoring the case law that proves that mandamus is the proper vehicle for recusal. (Pet.App.35.)(Appeal Nos.10-10698-A,10-10699-A,10-10700-A, and 10-10701-A.)

Judges Carnes, Barkett, and Hull struck again in Pet.App.43. They lied about the basis for the bias that Windsor swore was why the judges of the Eleventh Circuit should be recused in matters involving Judge Evans and Judge Duffey. They cited erroneous case law and ignored the Supreme Court's order in ***Liteky***. Then the further trampled Windsor's rights by ordering that Windsor could not respond to the denial and its perjury.(Pet.App.43.)(Dockets in Appeal Nos.09-16448-A,09-16493-A, and 09-16494-A.)

Judges Tjoflat, Edmondson, and Burch ignored the case law that says mandamus is the appropriate appellate action in matters of recusal.(Pet.App.45.) (Docket in Appeal No.10-10349-A.)

CITE ERRONEOUS CASE LAW

Judges Hull, Marcus, and Pryor quoted erroneous case law to dismiss an appeal sua sponte. This had to be reversed later.(Pet.App.20.) Judges can make honest mistakes, but based upon what happened before and after, Windsor believes they

simply cite erroneous case law when they don't want to do what the law provides.(Pet.App.12,¶1.)

Judges Tjoflat and cited ***Loranger v. Stierheim*** and ***United States v. Chandler***, but those cases do not support their argument.(Pet.App.15-17.) (See the Petition for Writ of Mandamus to disqualify Judge William S. Duffey that was filed with this Court the first week in November 2010.)

Judges Edmondson and Birch ignored the controlling case law on the use of mandamus on recusal. "Mandamus is the right and only means to seek review of a judge's refusal to recuse herself." (see ***United States v. Boyd***, 208 F.3d 638, 645 (7th Cir.2000); ***United States v. Balistrieri***, 779 F.2d 1191, 1204-05 (7th Cir.1985); ***In the Matter of: United States of America***, 398 F.3d 615 (2005).) They cited ***Christo v. Padgett***, which speaks of pervasive bias, and used the case to attempt to justify another aspect of their ruling. They ignored the fact that Windsor argued pervasive bias.(Pet.App.22.) (Docket in Appeal No.09-15232-D.)

Judges Carnes, Barkett, and Hull cited erroneous case law so they could ignore the case law that says mandamus is the appropriate appellate action in matters of recusal.(Pet.App.26.)(Dockets in Appeal Nos.09-14735-DD, 09-16493, and 09-16494.)

Judges Tjoflat, Edmondson, and Burch ignored the case law that says mandamus is the appropriate appellate action in matters of recusal.(Pet.App.33.) (Docket in Appeal No.10-10349-A.)

ISSUE SHORT, INADEQUATE DECISIONS

Pet.App.13 merely says "FRIVOLOUS sua sponte." Judges Hull, Marcus, and Pryor made this OUTRAGEOUS ruling without even considering anything from the Appellees. They claim to have made this decision solely from looking at Windsor's motions in the district court and his Brief. Based upon this statement in the Order, these judges committed perjury and fraud upon the courts. Windsor proved: Judge Evans erred by claiming there was not any evidence that Plaintiffs acted in bad faith in the course of this litigation, and Windsor's massive evidence was uncontroverted. The Plaintiffs / Appellees did not file a single, solitary affidavit and had no admissible evidence. Judge Evans erred because there is massive evidence of bad faith. Judge Evans erred because there was no factual support for the Appealed Order. Judge Evans erred in denying Rule 60(b) Motion due to improper interpretation of the law. Judge Evans "interpreted the law" dishonestly in the Appealed Order. Windsor cited 52 cases that proved the law. If Judge Evans is right and a closed case cannot be reopened through a Rule 60(b) motion, Windsor has thousands of cases where every federal court in the country were wrong. Judge Evans improperly defined "proceeding" to exclude a Rule 60(b) motion. Ridiculous. Judge Evans erred in ruling that the 60(b) motion was untimely. She ignored the letter of the law that says a motion to set aside a "Final Order and Judgment." Judge Evans erred by claiming Windsor did not have valid arguments under Rule 60(b). It was a timely, valid argument under each of the six sections of Rule 60(b). Perhaps

one or two sections were debatable, but the fraud upon the court was not debatable based upon the evidence. Judge Evans erred by failing to recuse herself. Windsor said she was biased against pro se parties, and Windsor now has massive evidence of this fact. (See Petition for Writ of Mandamus to disqualify Judge Evans that is being filed with this Court.) Judge Evans erred by failing to properly consider the Motion for Recusal. She did not follow the required procedures. Judge Evans erred by claiming Windsor did not enumerate meritorious reasons for a reasonable person to doubt the impartiality of Judge Evans. Windsor had a long list, though he believes the fact that she refused to even allow the perjury of the Plaintiffs and the subornation of the perjury by their attorneys was more than enough. Judge Evans erred by claiming that bias must be extra-judicial. ***Liteky*** does not say that, and besides, bias against a pro se party is extra-judicial. Judge Evans erred by claiming that recusal and consideration of motions by another judge would ultimately make no difference as to the outcome of the case. She may be right about that one, if the judge is from the Eleventh Circuit where Windsor knows that at least nine judges in Atlanta are corrupt. Judge Evans erred because the impartiality of the judge might reasonably be questioned. Judge Evans erred by failing to consider that the cumulative effect of the facts presented would be grounds for recusal – pervasive bias, clearly grounds under 28 U.S.C.455. Judge Evans erred by improper consideration of recusal under 28 U.S.C.144. Case law proves that she had to accept my certificate of good faith since Windsor is pro se. Judge Evans erred by failing to consider Windsor's

Constitutional justification for recusal. Judge Evans erred by failing to consider Windsor's Motion to Reopen under the Court's Inherent Powers. She didn't even address it. Judge Evans erred by claiming that Windsor's Rule 11 Motions for Sanctions were entirely lacking in merit. This is a serious case of perjury that is absolutely proven by the record. Judge Evans erred by failing to give Windsor his legal right to file a Reply to a Response. Judge Evans erred by failing to consider that this case casts doubt on the integrity of the judicial process. And Judges Hull, Marcus, and Pryor committed the same wrongdoing. Calling this motion FRIVOLOUS is about as corrupt as any judicial decision could be.(Pet.App.13.)

Judges Hull, Marcus, and Pryor were given a second chance with a motion for reconsideration, and they said nothing but "frivolous sua sponte" again. (Pet.App.18.) This Frivolous sua sponte is a favorite technique of some of the corrupt federal judges. They give an appellant absolutely nothing to go on, and the claim that the appeal is "frivolous" sets up the pro se party for them to award sanctions, thus scaring many honest people.(Pet.App.18.)

Judges Hull, Marcus, and Pryor gave no explanation of denying a motion for sanctions and thus sanctioned perjury by Maid's Attorneys. (Pet.App.20.)

Some of the judges, such as Judges Edmondson and Birch, Evans, and Duffey know how to pad an order to make it appear that the issues were addressed. Judges Edmondson and Burch took four

pages to recite the relief requested by Windsor, discuss erroneous case law to the issues, and deny the relief requested with no facts or case law or discussion to support the decision.(Pet.App.22.) (Docket in Appeal No.09-15232-D.)

Judges Carnes, Barkett, and Hull are pros in padding an order to make it appear that the issues were addressed. Judges Carnes, Barkett, and Hull took three pages to recite the relief requested by Windsor in three petitions for writ of mandamus and say "Petitioner has failed to carry his burden.... Therefore, these petitions for writ of mandamus are denied." They gave no facts or case law or discussion to support the decision other than one erroneous citation claiming that mandamus is not appropriate for recusal as Judges Edmondson and Burch did in Pet.App.22.(Pet.App.26.)(Dockets in Appeal Nos.09-14735-DD, 09-16493, and 09-16494.)

Judges Carnes, Barkett, and Hull ignored everything and issued one of the most outlandish orders ever in Appeal No. 09-14735-DD. (Pet.App.29.) They ignored the facts. They ignored the law. They dismissed an appeal as frivolous with no explanation whatsoever.(Pet.App.29.)(Docket in Appeal No.09-14735-DD.)

Judges Black and Wilson completely and totally ignored Windsor's absolutely valid issues. (Pet.App.35.) Their order does not discuss a single one of Windsor's points in an appeal where the law and the facts are absolutely overwhelming against Judge Evans' order. The only finding in the five page order (padded mercilessly) is "After review, we find

that Petitioner has failed to carry his burden...." This clearly violates ***Corcoran v. Levenhagen***. (Pet.App.35.)(Appeal Nos.10-10698-A,10-10699-A, 10-10700-A, and 10-10701-A.)

Judges Carnes, Barkett, and Hull said nothing in Pet.App.43 but a lie about the basis for the bias that Windsor swore was why the judges of the Eleventh Circuit should be recused in matters involving Judge Evans and Judge Duffey. Windsor's petition stated: "Windsor submits that judges do everything possible to protect fellow judges. As a 30-year veteran of the Northern District of Georgia and as a former Chief Judge, Windsor submits that Judge Evans is a senior judge who is being protected by her fellow judges. Windsor asked that this Appeal and all of his appeals be moved to another District where the judges will not be friends and associates of Judge Evans and Judge Duffey and where the appellate judges are honest and abide by the law." They cited erroneous case law and ignored the Supreme Court's order in ***Liteky***. Then the further trampled Windsor's rights by ordering that Windsor could not respond to the denial and its perjury. (Pet.App.43.)(Dockets in Appeal Nos.09-16448-A,09-16493-A, and 09-16494-A.)

Judges Carnes, Hull, and Marcus ignored everything in Appeal Nos. 10-12517-A.(Pet.App.55.) They ignored the facts. They ignored the law. They dismissed as frivolous with no explanation whatsoever. There is nothing whatsoever frivolous about the appeal; it covers similar issues to appeals ruled not frivolous. The law is crystal clear that

Judge Evans violated the law. (Pet.App.55.)(Docket in Appeal No.10-12517-A.)

Judges Edmondson, Birch, and Wilson ignored everything in Appeal Nos. 10-12450-A.(Pet.App.57.) They dismissed as frivolous with no explanation whatsoever.(Pet.App.57.)(Docket in Appeal No.10-12450-A.)

A review of all of the orders in the Pet.App. will reveal that 62 pages of orders from the Judges of the Eleventh Circuit yielded not one single sentence that addressed Windsor's facts or citations of law. There was no discussion of factual or legal issues other than to recite boilerplate order language and factual background. (Five sentences about facts raised were in Pet.App.1 handled by Windsor's attorney.)

This Court says judges may not issue these inadequate orders. (***Corcoran v. Leverhagen***, 558 U. S. ____(2009).) But they get away with it because this Court seems to only choose to review cases that will establish new precedents. A tiny fraction of the Petitions for Writ of Certiorari get granted.

SAY ONE THING AND DO ANOTHER

Judges Dubina, Hull, and Fay said they were reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, but that actually constitutes perjury because they did no such thing. The record of the court in MIST-1 and in Appeal No.07-14214 will prove this to any honest judge. (Pet.App.p.7,¶2.)

COMMIT PERJURY

Judges Dubina, Hull, and Fay make various statements that are absolutely proven wrong by the facts and the law. These judges had an obligation to review the record and indeed claimed they did. Therefore, these were false statements made intentionally while under their oath as judges, and that's perjury. All of the Defendant Judges should be tried for perjury just as Judge Mary Waterstone is in Michigan (case citation unknown, but see http://www.freep.com/article/20101013/NEWS02/101013031/0/ent) (Pet.App.7,¶2-4 and Pet.App.8,¶1.)

Judges Dubina, Pryor, and Anderson emphasize a technique that Eleventh Circuit Judges use to foster their corrupt practices. They don't publish the corrupt opinions. Windsor looks forward to determining how many pro se orders are published compared to the percentage of opinions published when there are attorneys on both sides. It will be staggering. Judges Dubina, Pryor, and Anderson refused to allow the order in Pet.App.40 to be published that Windsor moved to have published. Honest lawyers and judges would have instantly seen that the order violates just about everything. (Pet.App.61.)

DO WHATEVER IT TAKES TO SUPPORT THEIR FRIENDS AT THE DISTRICT COURTS –

The entire Pet.App. reflects this, pp.2-62.

Judges Edmondson and Birch did this very specifically in claiming mandamus was not proper for

seeking recusal of Judge Evans.(Pet.App.22.)(Docket in Appeal No.09-15232-D.)

Judges Carnes, Barkett, and Hull also did this very specifically in claiming mandamus was not proper for seeking recusal of Judge Evans. (Pet.App.26.)(Dockets in Appeal Nos.09-14735-DD,09-16493, and 09-16494.)

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Judges Tjoflat, Edmondson, and Burch ignored the case law that says mandamus is the appropriate appellate action in matters of recusal.(Pet.App.33.) (Docket in Appeal No.10-10349-A.)

Judges Black and Wilson supported both Judge Evans and Judge Duffey in one order. (Pet.App.35.) This is a horrible order in which they demonstrate bias by making absolutely false statements obtained from their fellow judges.(Pet.App.35.)(Docket in Appeal Nos.10-10698-A,10-10699-A,10-10700-A, and 10-10701-A.)

Judges Carnes, Barkett, and Hull might as well have been on Judges Evans and Duffey's payroll with Pet.App.40. They illegally and maliciously claimed that Windsor exceeded the page limits that do not exist in FRAP 38. They ignored and never even ruled

on motions that pertained to the same issue and preceded this refusal to even allow Windsor's response to be filed. After it was file stamped by the Clerk, it was returned over a month later with the file stamp scratched out. Judges Carnes, Barkett, and Hull granted sanctions against Windsor and to Maid in an appeal that Windsor should have won hands-down. To add insult to injury, they never issued a judgment, and their order gave no direction to the Clerk of the Court to issue a writ of execution, but the Clerk did both. Maid has filed liens on all of Windsor's assets and those of his wife, and Windsor is suing the Clerk of the Court over the wrongful actions. To just add a little more violation of Windsor's rights to due process, they ordered that Windsor could not file a motion for reconsideration or any motion of any type in this matter ever. Judges Carnes, Barkett, and Hull need to be high on Congressional list of the Atlanta federal judges to be impeached.(Pet.App.40.)(Docket in Appeal No.09-14735-DD.)

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where the appellate judges are honest and abide by the law." They cited erroneous case law and ignored the Supreme Court's order in ***Liteky***. Then the further trampled Windsor's rights by ordering that Windsor could not respond to the denial and its perjury. (Pet.App.43.)(Dockets in Appeal Nos.09-16448-A,09-16493-A, and 09-16494-A.)

Judges Tjoflat, Edmondson, and Burch ignored the case law that says mandamus is the appropriate appellate action in matters of recusal.(Pet.App.45.) (Docket in Appeal No.10-10349-A.)

Even the screening orders that have ALL said that Windsor's appeals are not frivolous show bias. They include language that implies that Windsor exceeded pages or words in motions or briefs, and Windsor has NEVER done any such thing. (Pet.App.47,52.)

Windsor has been blocked from seeking reconsideration of orders or petitioning for rehearing en banc. This keeps Windsor from reaching the honest judges at the Eleventh Circuit.(Pet.App.50.)

Judges Carnes, Hull, and Marcus ignored everything in Appeal Nos. 10-12517-A.(Pet.App.55.) They ignored the facts. They ignored the law. They dismissed as frivolous with no explanation whatsoever. There is nothing whatsoever frivolous about the appeal; it covers similar issues to appeals ruled not frivolous. The law is crystal clear that Judge Evans violated the law.(Pet.App.55.)(Docket in Appeal No.10-12517-A.)

Judges Edmondson, Birch, and Wilson ignored everything in Appeal Nos. 10-12450-A.(Pet.App.57.) They ignored the facts. They ignored the law. They dismissed as frivolous with no explanation whatsoever. There is nothing whatsoever frivolous about the appeal; it covers identical issues to appeals ruled not frivolous. The law is crystal clear that Judge Evans violated the law. Significant case law was cited by Windsor. (Pet.App.57.)(Docket in Appeal No.10-12450-A.)

TRAMPLE THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF LITIGANTS

Virtually all of these orders trampled Windsor's Constitutional rights.(Pet.App.pp.2-70.)

Judges Carnes, Barkett, and Hull ignored everything and issued one of the most outlandish orders ever in Appeal No. 09-14735-DD.(Pet.App.29.) They ignored the facts. They ignored the law. They dismissed an appeal as frivolous with no explanation whatsoever. And after all that, they violated Windsor's Constitutional rights even more severely in Pet.App.40.(Pet.App.29.)(Docket in Appeal No. 09-14735-DD.)

Judges Black and Wilson completely and totally trampled Windsor's Constitutional rights in Pet.App.35. Windsor sought a stay due to an absolutely outrageous order by Judge Evans that violates all of the case law on filing injunctions, and they not only denied the motion without addressing a single issue, but they restricted Windsor further, without notice or an opportunity to be heard. The

restrictions are totally unfounded because Windsor has filed nothing even remotely frivolous. (Pet.App.35.)(Docket in Appeal Nos.10-10698-A,10-10699-A,10-10700-A, and 10-10701-A.)

Judges Carnes, Barkett, and Hull trampled Windsor mercilessly in Pet.App.40. They illegally and maliciously claimed that Windsor exceeded the page limits that do not exist in FRAP 38. They ignored and never even ruled on motions that pertained to the same issue and preceded this refusal to even allow Windsor's response to be filed. After it was file stamped by the Clerk, it was returned over a month later with the file stamp scratched out. Judges Carnes, Barkett, and Hull granted sanctions against Windsor and to Maid in an appeal that Windsor should have won hands-down. To add insult to injury, they never issued a judgment, and their order gave no direction to the Clerk of the Court to issue a writ of execution, but the Clerk did both. Maid has filed liens on all of Windsor's assets and those of his wife, and Windsor is suing the Clerk of the Court over the wrongful actions. To just add a little more violation of Windsor's rights to due process, they ordered that Windsor could not file a motion for reconsideration or any motion of any type in this matter ever. Judges Carnes, Barkett, and Hull need to be high on Congressional list of the Atlanta federal judges to be impeached.(Pet.App.40.)(Docket in Appeal No.09-14735-DD.)

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Windsor hereby reports the crimes described herein to this Court pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§4 and asks that this information be presented to a federal grand jury. Windsor also hopes that the House and Senate Judiciary Committees will investigate.

Windsor's lawsuit against the Defendant Judges is pursuant in part to 28 U.S.C.§1331, to redress the deprivation of rights secured him by the Constitution and the First, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C.§1983, 42 U.S.C.§1988, and the common law and redressable pursuant to ***Bivens v. Six Unknown Narcotics Agents*** 403 U.S. 388 (1971).

IV. JUDGES OF THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT HAVE A BIAS AGAINST WINDSOR.

Judges of the Eleventh Circuit have established a bias against Windsor. This is extra-judicial.

Judges of the Eleventh Circuit have a bias against anyone who would have the audacity to sue a fellow judge and try to expose corruption in the federal judiciary in Atlanta, Georgia.

Windsor suspects there is a dartboard somewhere at the Eleventh Circuit with his picture on it. Windsor's family is concerned that one of the corrupt judges will try to kill him.

Seven judges from the Eleventh Circuit are named as Defendants in a civil action filed by Windsor. Windsor's Verified Action charge these judges with corruption.

Any judge from this circuit assigned to hear a matter involving Windsor will be friends with the

Judges of the Eleventh Circuit. Friendships create an extra-judicial bias in favor of the friend and an extra-judicial bias against anyone who would sue a judge.

V. THE AVERAGE REASONABLE PERSON WOULD DOUBT THAT THE JUDGES OF THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT COULD BE IMPARTIAL WITH WINDSOR.

The impartiality of the judges of the Eleventh Circuit must be questioned.

The standard for review in recusal is not what the judges think; it is what reasonable people think.

> "'A party seeking recusal need not show actual bias on the part of the court, only the possibility of bias . . . Under§455(a), if a reasonable man, were he to know all the circumstances, would harbor doubts about the judge's impartiality under the applicable standard, then the judge must recuse.'" *Selkridge v. United of Omaha Life Ins. Co.*, 360 F.3d 155, 167 (3d Cir. 2004)(quoting *Krell v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am.* (*In re Prudential Ins. Co. Am. Sales Practice Litig. Agent Actions*), 148 F.3d 283, 343 (3d Cir. 1998)). (See also *Liteky v. United States*, 510 U.S. 540, 550 (1994); *Withrow v. Larkin*, 421 U. S. 35, 47 (1975); *Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co., Inc.*, 129 S.Ct. 2252, 173 L.Ed.2d 1208 (U.S. 06/08/2009).)

> "The probability of actual bias on the part of the judge . . . is too high to be constitutionally tolerable;" (***Berger v. United States***, 255 U.S. 22, (1921), 41 S.Ct. 230, 65 L.Ed. 481 1921)

If a clerk goes out into public and asks 100 people whether the Judges of the Eleventh Circuit might be impartial if someone who sued their fellow judge friend appeared as a party in his court, the result will be overwhelming that the impartiality must be questioned. The Petitioner has done so and knows.

A reasonable person would question the impartiality of any judge toward a pro se party who is taking legal action against another judge, especially those they have been friends with for many years.

VI. THE RULINGS OF THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ON EXTRAJUDICIAL BIAS ARE IN CONFLICT WITH A DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

The Supreme Court expressed in 1994 that the source of impartiality by a judge need not necessarily stem from an extrajudicial source. (***Liteky v US***, supra.)

VII. THIS PETITION PRESENTS AN ISSUE OF VITAL IMPORTANCE TO ALL CITIZENS.

Every person "has a constitutional and statutory right to an impartial and fair judge at all stages of the proceeding." (*Liteky v. U.S.*, 510 US 540 (1994).

Unless this Court acts today and sends a strong message about bias and corruption in the federal courts, the corrupt judges will continue to deprive citizens of their rights.

This is a very important issue of the most basic of Constitutional rights.

VIII. THIS WRIT WILL BE IN AID OF THE COURT'S APPELLATE JURISDICTION, AND THERE ARE EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES THAT WARRANT THE EXERCISE OF THE COURT'S DISCRETIONARY POWERS. ADEQUATE RELIEF CANNOT BE OBTAINED FROM ANY OTHER COURT.

Windsor is pro se, and he is interpreting *Marbury v. Madison*, 1 Cranch 137, 175 when it says "it must be shown to be an exercise of appellate jurisdiction" to mean that Windsor must show that this is in essence an appeal. Windsor attempted to have Judge Duffey and Judge Evans disqualified at both the District Court and Eleventh Circuit. Windsor attempted to have the Eleventh Circuit judges disqualified at the Eleventh Circuit, but the motion was dismissed. Windsor has further read that the recusal of a judge can only be handled through mandamus.

Windsor respectfully submits that there is nothing that qualifies as "exceptional circumstances" more than biased, corrupt federal judges.

CONCLUSION

Under the circumstances, disqualification is the only remedy that will promote the public's faith in the integrity and fairness of the federal judicial system, prompt other judges to handle motions for recusal properly, restore impartiality to the parties in the judicial process, and secure the relief that the Petitioner deserves.

For all of the above reasons, the Petitioner now respectfully prays that this Court grant a Writ of Mandamus to order the Eleventh Circuit to disqualify all judges from presiding in any matters involving the Petitioner. This Court should make it clear to lower courts that extrajudicial bias is not required in recusal; the perception of reasonable people of the appearance of bias necessitates recusal if there is any chance that the party will not receive a fair trial.

All cases involving Windsor should be transferred to another circuit. Windsor has filed motions requesting intercircuit transfers, but these have thus far been ignored.

FINAL NOTE FROM THE PETITIONER

Please read the "Final Note from the Petitioner" on pages 43-45 of the Petition for Writ of Mandamus to disqualify Judge William S. Duffey that was recently filed with this Court.

In accordance with 28 U.S.C.§1746, I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true

and correct based upon my personal knowledge, except as to the matters herein stated to be alleged on information and belief, and that as to those matters I believe them to be true.

Respectfully submitted this 5 day of November, 2010,

William M. Windsor
Pro Se

Supreme Court, U.S.
FILED
10-633 NOV 5 - 2010
OFFICE OF THE CLERK

No.

In The
Supreme Court of the United States

In re WILLIAM M. WINDSOR

WILLIAM M. WINDSOR,

Petitioner

v.

Judge Joel F. Dubina, Judge Rosemary Barkett, Judge Edward Earl Carnes, Judge James Larry Edmondson, Judge Frank M. Hull, Judge Stanley Marcus, Judge William H. Pryor, Jr., Judge Gerald Bard Tjoflat, Judge Beverly B. Martin, Judge Susan H. Black, Judge Charles R. Wilson, Judge James C. Hill, Judge Peter T. Fay, Judge Phyllis A. Kravitch, Judge R. Lanier Anderson, and Judge Emmett Ripley Cox

Respondents

On Petition for Writ of Mandamus
To The United States Court of Appeals for The Eleventh Circuit

PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
APPENDIX

William M. Windsor
Pro Se
PO Box 681236
Marietta, GA 30068
770-578-1094

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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 07-14214

MAID OF THE MIST CORPORATION.
MAID OF THE MIST STEAMBOAT COMPANY, LTD.,

Plaintiffs-Counter-Defendants-Appellees,

Versus

WILLIAM M. WINDSOR,

Defendant-Counter-Claimant-Appellant.

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia

---

BEFORE: DUBINA, HULL and FAY, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM:

BY THE COURT:

Appellants Alcatraz Media, LLC, Alcatraz Media, Inc. (collectively "Alcatraz"), and William Windsor appeal the district court's grant of Appellee Maid of the Mist's ("Maid") motion for summary judgment. Additionally, Alcatraz and Windsor appeal the district court's order granting permanent

injunctive relief against them. Alcatraz and Windsor also appeal the district court's order granting Maid attorney's fees and costs.

We review a district court's order granting summary judgment de novo, reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. See Patrick v. Floyd Med. Ctr, 201 F.3d 1313, 1315 (11th Cir. 2000). We review the scope of a district court's order granting permanent injunctive relief for abuse of discretion. See Palmer & Cav, Inc. v. March & McLennan Cos. Inc., 404 F.3d 1297, 1308 (11th Cir. 2005).

After reviewing the record, reading the parties' briefs, and having the benefit of oral argument, we conclude the district court properly granted summary judgment to Maid on its claim for tortious interference with business operations and properly issued a permanent injunction against Alcatraz and Windsor. The record demonstrates that Alcatraz and Windsor: (1) acted improperly and without privilege; (2) acted purposely and maliciously with the intent to injure Maid; (3) induced third parties not to enter into or continue a business relationship with Maid; and (4) caused Maid financial injury. Thus, the permanent injunction was properly granted because Maid demonstrated success on the merits, continuing irreparable injury, and the lack of an adequate remedy at law.

We also conclude from the record that the district court properly granted summary judgment in Maid's favor on Alcatraz's counterclaims for

breach of contract, promissory estoppel, and slander, in violation of the Georgia Fair Business Practices Act. Alcatraz's counterclaims were meritless, and Alcatraz asserted these claims to cause Maid unnecessary financial hardship. Because we see no merit to any of the arguments Alcatraz or Windsor make in this appeal, we affirm the district court's order granting summary judgment and its order granting permanent injunctive relief.

Similarly, we conclude that the district court properly determined that Maid is entitled to recover attorney's fees and expenses for its successful tortious interference claim under O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11 based on Alcatraz and Windsor's stubbornly litigious pre-suit conduct that gave rise to this litigation . See Paul v. Destito, 250 Ga. App. 631, 642, 550 S .E.2d 739, 749-750 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001) (stating that a plaintiff can recover fees and expenses for successful claims and cannot recover fees and expenses for unsuccessful claims, abandoned claims, or counterclaim defenses).

We have concerns, however, about the district court's lack of explanation as to the amount of fees and expenses it awarded. Although the district court has considerable latitude in formulating attorney's fee awards, it must describe its calculation of attorney's fees and expenses to provide this court an adequate and informed basis for review. Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, 931 F.2d 811, 814 (11th Cir. 1991). Conclusory statements about the appropriateness of fees and expenses awarded do not allow for meaningful review. See Norman v. Hous. Auto. Of Montgomery, 836 F.2d 1292, 1304 (11th Cir. 1988)

("The court's order on attorney's fees must allow for meaningful review-the district court must articulate the decisions it made, give principled reasons for those decisions, and show its calculation.")

Here, the district court's limited explanation of its award of attorney's fees and expenses precludes meaningful review. The district court stated the amount of fees and expenses it awarded and described them as "reasonable" considering Alcatraz and Windsor's conduct and "the billing judgment exercised in similar cases in the Atlanta market for comparable legal services." On appeal, Alcatraz and Windsor argue that certain specific time and expense entries are not recoverable because many do not relate to Maid's successful tortious interference claim and because those that do are excessive. Because the district court provided such a limited explanation of its calculations, we cannot address these arguments adequately on appeal.

Although the district court properly found that the hourly rates were reasonable, it did not delineate which hours and entries were excluded or reduced as relating to (1) the unsuccessful claims, (2) the defense of counterclaims, and (3) the numerous hours that Alcatraz alleges were excessive for the tasks performed.

A blanket twenty-five percent reduction, without explanation as to why such reduction was appropriate under the circumstances and what hours in the above categories were excluded, does not resolve our concerns. Further, the district court

failed to address the appropriateness of certain expense entries that Alcatraz and Windsor claim are inappropriate or excessive, including, among other things, approximately $19,000 for private jet flights, $25,000 for photocopying, and bills from Brooks Brothers.

Nothing herein should imply that the total amounts awarded were unreasonable. Rather, we simply cannot conduct meaningful review of whether or not they were. Accordingly, we vacate the award of attorney's fees and expenses and remand to the district court for reconsideration of the award with a full, explicit explanation of the reasons for the district court's determination of these amounts.

AFFIRMED, IN PART; VACATED AND REMANDED, IN PART.

FILED
U.S.COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

OCT 21 2008

THOMAS K. KAHN
CLERK

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 09-13998-A

WILLIAM M. WINDSOR,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

Versus

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
JUDGE ORINDA D. EVANS,
HAWKINS & PARNELL, LLP,
CARL HUGO ANDERSON,
PHILLIPS LYTLE, LLP,
Et al.,

Defendants-Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia

---

BEFORE: HULL, MARCUS, and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.

BY THE COURT:

This appeal is DISMISSED sua sponte, for lack of jurisdiction. The district court's July 30, 2009, order is not final or immediately appealable because the order did not dispose of all the parties or claims, and the stay did not effectively put William M. Windsor out of court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291; Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 10, 103 S.Ct. 927, 934, 74 L.Ed.2d 765 (1983); Haley v. City of Cumming, 69 F.3d 1098 (11th Cir. 1995); Atlantic Federal Sav. & Loan Ass'n b. Blythe Eastman Paine Webber, Inc., 890 F.2d 371, 375-376 (11th Cir. 1989); Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Edward D. Stone, Jr. & Assoc., 743 F.2d 1519, 1523-24 (11th Cir. 1984).

No motion for reconsideration may be filed unless it complies with the timing and other requirements of 11th Cir.R. 27-2 and all other applicable rules.

FILED
U.S.COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

Sep 8 2009

THOMAS K. KAHN
CLERK

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 09-13086-DD

MAID OF THE MIST CORPORATION.
MAID OF THE MIST STEAMBOAT COMPANY, LTD.,

Plaintiffs-Counter-Defendants-Appellees,

Versus

WILLIAM M. WINDSOR,

Defendant-Counter-Claimant-Appellant.

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia

---

BEFORE: HULL, MARCUS and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.

BY THE COURT:

After review of the Appellant's motions below, the District Court's Order and Appellant's brief, we DISMISS this appeal AS FRIVOLOUS sua sponte. See Eleventh Circuit Rule 42-4.

All remaining pending motions are DENIED AS MOOT.

FILED
U.S.COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

SEP 09 2009

THOMAS K. KAHN
CLERK

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 09-14018-A

Dist. Ct. Docket No. 09-02027-WSD-1

IN RE:

William M. Windsor.

Petitioner.

On Petition for Writ of Mandamus to the
United States District Court for the
Northern District of Georgia

BEFORE: TJOFLAT and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.

BY THE COURT:

William M. Windsor, proceeding pro se, filed this mandamus petition, asking this Court to order the recusal of the district judge in Windsor's independent action for relief from the judgment in a prior case in which Windsor was a co-defendant. Mandamus is available "only in drastic situations, when no other adequate means are available to remedy a clear usurpation of power or abuse of

discretion." See Jackson v. Motel 6 Multipurpose, Inc. 130 F.3d. 999, 1004 (11th Cir. 1997); In re Lopez-Lukis, 113 F.3d. 1187, 1187-88 (11th Cir. 1997). The petitioner has the burden of showing that the claimed right to issuance of the write is clear and indisputable. Lopez-Lukis, 113 F.3d at 1188.

Recusal of a district court judge is required under 28 U.S.C. § 144 when a party demonstrates that the judge "has a personal bias or prejudice" against him or in favor of an adverse party. A judge must "disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned." 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). Matters arising out of the course of judicial proceedings, however, are not a proper basis for recusal. Disqualification under 455(a) is required only when the alleged bias is personal in nature, that is, stemming from an extra-judicial source. Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 554-55, 114 S.Ct. 1147, 1157, 127 L.Ed.2d 474 (1994); Loranger v. Stierheim, 10 F.3d 776, 780 (11th Cir. 1994). Generally, a judge's rulings in a case are not valid grounds for recusal. Loranger, 10 F.3d at 780. "Likewise, a judge's rulings in a related case may not ordinarily serve as the basis for recusal." United States v. Chandler, 996 F.2d 1073, 1104 (11th Cir. 1993) (emphasis added). In rare cases, recusal may be required when "such pervasive bias and prejudice in shown by otherwise judicial conduct as would constitute bias against a party." Loranger, 10 F.3d at 780 (quotation omitted).

Here, Windsor has not shown bias stemming from an extra-judicial source. Rather, his claims of bias and prejudice are based on adverse rulings

made by the district court in a related case, which are not valid grounds for recusal. Chandler, 996 F.2d at 1104. Moreover, the judge's finding in the related case that Windsor made "scurrilous and irresponsible" accusations against another district judge in support of a subpoena Windsor served upon the judge does not show extrajudicial or pervasive bias as to warrant recusal. Accordingly, this mandamus petition is **DENIED**.

FILED
U.S.COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

SEP 17 2009

THOMAS K. KAHN
CLERK

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 09-13086-DD

MAID OF THE MIST CORPORATION.
MAID OF THE MIST STEAMBOAT COMPANY, LTD.,

Plaintiffs-Counter-Defendants-Appellees,

Versus

WILLIAM M. WINDSOR,

Defendant-Counter-Claimant-Appellant.

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia

---

BEFORE: HULL, MARCUS and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.

BY THE COURT:

Appellant's motion for reconsideration of our September 9, 2009, Order dismissing this appeal as frivolous sua sponte is DENIED.

Appellee's Rule 38 motion for sanctions is DENIED.

FILED
U.S.COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

OCT 20 2009

THOMAS K. KAHN
CLERK

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 09-13998-A

WILLIAM M. WINDSOR,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

Versus

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
JUDGE ORINDA D. EVANS,
HAWKINS & PARNELL, LLP,
CARL HUGO ANDERSON,
PHILLIPS LYTLE, LLP,
Et al.,

Defendants-Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia

---

BEFORE: HULL, MARCUS, and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.

BY THE COURT:

William M. Windsor's motion for reconsideration is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. The motion for reconsideration is DENIED as to the district court's July 30, 2009, written order. The motion for reconsideration is GRANTED with regard to the district court's July 30, 2009 oral order denying Windsor's motion for preliminary injunction. See 28 U.S.C. 1292(a)(1); AT&T Broadband v. Tech Communications, Inc., 381 F.3d 1309, 1314 (11th Cir. 2004). Windsor's motion to file his reply brief out-of-time is GRANTED. Windsor's motion to strike the appellees' response to his motion for reconsideration is DENIED. Windsor's motion to sanction the appellees is DENIED.

FILED
U.S.COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

Nov 20 2009

THOMAS K. KAHN
CLERK

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 09-15232-D

Dist. Ct. Docket No. 1:06-CV-0714-ODE

IN RE:

William M. Windsor,

Petitioner.

On Petition for Writ of Mandamus to the
United States District Court for the
Northern District of Georgia

BEFORE: EDMONDSON and BIRCH, Circuit Judges.

BY THE COURT:

William M. Windsor, a private individual, files this mandamus petition pro se, requesting that we: (1) order Judge Evans to recuse herself; (2) vacate the orders in the civil case because the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction on account of Judge Evans's perjury and obstruction of justice; (3) order the district court to conduct an evidentiary

hearing (4) require the district court to conduct a conference prior to considering the issues; (5) clarify in the writ of mandamus the law in the Circuit for the issues generated by this action; (6) vacate the order denying his motion for recusal; (7) disqualify Judge Evans from participating in the above case or any matter relating to Windsor; (8) assign a new judge, preferably from another district; and (9) order the district court to allow Windsor to conduct discovery on issues raised in 2009. Last, he asserts that Judge Evans has yet to rule on his motions. Windsor also filed a motion requesting that he be allowed to reference docket entries in his mandamus petition without attaching them as exhibits.

Mandamus is available "only in drastic situations, when no other adequate means are available to remedy a clear usurpation of power or abuse of discretion." See Jackson v. Motel 6 Multipurpose, Inc., 130 F.3d 999, 1004 (11th Cir. 1997). Mandamus may not be used as a substitute for appeal or to control decisions of the district court in discretionary matters. Id. "In particular, a writ of mandamus may issue only to confine an inferior court to a lawful exercise of its prescribed jurisdiction or to compel it to exercise its authority when it is its duty to do so," In re Smith, 926 F.2d 1027, 1030 (11th Cir. 1991) (quotation omitted). The petitioner has the burden of showing that the claimed right to issuance of the writ is clear and indisputable. In re Lopez-Lukis, 113 F.3d 1187, 1188 (11th Cir. 1997). Mandamus may be used to direct a district court to decide a pending case where there has been an unreasonable delay in rendering a

decision. Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co.; 437 U.S. 655, 661-62, 98 S.Ct. 2552, 2557, 57 L.Ed .2d 504 (1978),

Recusal of a district court judge is required under 28 U .S.C. § 144 when a party demonstrates that the judge "has a personal bias or prejudice" against him or in favor of an adverse party. A judge must "disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned." 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). Matters arising out of the course of judicial proceedings, however, are not a proper basis for recusal, and disqualification under § 455(a) is required only when the alleged bias is personal in nature, that is, stemming from an extra judicial source. Loranger v. Staerheim, 10 F.3d 776, 780 (11th Cir, 1994). Additionally, while refusals to recuse are reviewable in mandamus, they are also reviewable on appeal. Christo v. Padgett, 22.3 F.3d 1324, 1333 n.10 (11th Cir. 2000). Generally, a judge's rulings in a case are not valid grounds for recusal. Loranger, 10 F.3d at 7$0. Recusal may be required when "such pervasive bias and prejudice is shown by otherwise judicial conduct as would constitute bias against a party." Id. (quotation omitted).

Windsor is not entitled to mandamus relief. His appeal of the denial of his motion to recuse was an adequate alternative remedy regarding his requests for: (1) recusal; (2) a new judge; and (3) voiding the orders in the case, and he may not seek to raise the issues again in mandamus. To the extent he asks us to clarify in the writ of mandamus the law applicable to his issues or to vacate the orders in his case, such relief is not cognizable in mandamus. Last, Windsor's has not established substantial

delay by the district court in ruling on his motions. Accordingly, Windsor's petition for a writ of mandamus is DENIED. His motion to reference docket entries without attaching them as exhibits is DENIED as unnecessary.

FILED
U.S.COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

DEC 14 2009

THOMAS K. KAHN
CLERK

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

_____1:09-CV-02027-WSD_____

No. 09-14735-DD

IN RE:

WILLIAM M. WINDSOR,

Petitioner

On Petition for Writ of Mandamus to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia

---

BEFORE: CARNES, BARKETT, and HULL, Circuit Judges.

BY THE COURT:

Pro se Petitioner William M. Windsor has field three separate petitions for writ of mandamus. In No. 09-16448, Petitioner asks this Court to order District Judge Evans to unseal Docket Entry Bo. 168 filed in Maid of the Mist Corporation v. Alcatraz Media, LLC., Civil Action No. 1:06-CV-0714-ODE. Petitioner also asks this Court to "censure" District Judge Evans for denying Petitioner's motion to unseal that document.

In No. 09-16493, Petitioner asks this Court to order District Judge Evans to allow Alcatraz Media, LLC. And Alcatraz Media, Inc. to proceed without counsel in the now-closed underlying action. Petitioner also asks the Court to "toll the statute of limitations on claims available to Alcatraz to July 27, 2009 or October 22, 2009, the dates on which motions were filed seeking a waiver of representation for Alcatraz." To the extent that such a request can be made to the United States Supreme Court, Petitioner asks that the request be made.

In No. 09-16494, Petitioner asks this Court to Compel District Judge Duffey to recuse himself from Windsor v. U.S., Civil Action No. 1:09-CV-02027-WSD. Petitioner also asks us to direct that all orders in that case be vacated, to require the defendants to file answers, to "notify the appropriate authorities of the appearance of professional misconduct" by individuals associated with the underlying case, and to direct the reassignment of his case to a judge "who is not associated" with District Judge Evans.

The Court notes that Petitioner's two previous petitions for writ of mandamus, Nos. 09-14018 and 09-15232, sought similar relief, at least in part, and that those petitions were denied by this Court. As this Court pointed out in its previous mandamus orders, mandamus is appropriate only when "no other adequate means are available to remedy a clear usurpation of power or abuse of discretion" by the district court. See In re: Loudermilch, 158 F.3d 1143, 1144 (11th Cir. 1998); see also In re: Bethesda Memorial Hosp., Inc., 123 F.3d 1407, 1408 (11th

Cir.1997). In addition, Petitioner has the burden to show that his right to issuance of the writ is 'clear and undisputable.'" See In re Lopez-Lukis, 113 F.3d 1187, 1188 (11th Cir. 1997) citing Kerr v. United States District Court for the Northern District of California, 426 U.S. 394, 403, 96 S.Ct. 2219, 2124, 48 L.Ed.2d 725 (1976).

After review, we find that Petitioner has failed to carry his burden both showing that there is no other adequate remedy or that, on the merits of his petitions, he is entitled to a writ. Therefore, these petitions for writ of mandamus are DENIED.

FILED
U.S.COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

FEB 18 2010
THOMAS K. KAHN
CLERK

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 09-14735-DD

MAID OF THE MIST CORPORATION,
MAID OF THE MIST STEAMBOAT COMPANY, LTD.,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

Versus

WILLIAM M. WINDSOR,

Defendant-Appellant

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia

---

BEFORE: CARNES, BARKETT and HULL, Circuit Judges.

BY THE COURT:

Now pending before the Court are numerous motions filed both by Appellant and by Appellees Maid of the Mist, et al. ("Maid"). Included in those motions are Appellant's "Emergency Motion to Disqualify Eleventh Circuit Judges and Motion to Change Venue" and Maid's Motion for Sanctions for Filing a Frivolous Appeal.

It is plain from review of Appellant's motion, as well as this history of this appeal and the previous cases filed by Appellant in this Court, that he seeks to disqualify the members of this Court based on his belief that previous adverse rulings were the result of bias, dishonesty or some other improper motivation or intent, up to and including relationships with Judges Evans and Duffey of the Northern District of Georgia.

However, as the Supreme Court stated in Liteky v. U.S., 510 U.S. 540 555,114 S.Ct. 1147, 1157 (1994), "judicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion." see also Byrne v. Nezhat, 261 F.3d 1075, 1103 (11th Cir. 2001); McWhorter v. City of Birmingham, 906 F .2d 674, 678 (11th Cir. 1990). Appellant's motion to disqualify and the other motions filed by Appellant fail to allege any valid basis for disqualification. Consequently, Appellant's motion to disqualify this Court is without merit and is DENIED

In reviewing the motions filed with the Court, we have also reviewed Appellant's brief, which fails to meaningfully challenge the orders on appeal. Consequently, we sua sponte DISMISS this appeal AS FRIVOLOUS AS BRIEFED. See 11th Cir. R. 42-4.

With the exception of Maid's Motion for Sanctions for Filing a Frivolous Appeal, all remaining motions are DENIED AS MOOT.

We now turn to Maid's Motion for Sanctions for Filing a Frivolous Appeal. Although this motion initially cites to 11th Cir. Rule 27-4 (sanctions for filing a frivolous motion), the motion later cites to Fed.R.App.P. 38 and was filed contemporaneously with Maid's brief as required by Rule 38. We therefore consider this motion filed pursuant to Rule 38 and analyze it under that rule. We take into consideration the fact that, despite Appellant's prolific filings, Appellant is a pro se litigant.

Rule 38 provides that: "If a court of appeals determines that an appeal is frivolous, it may, after a separately filed motion or notice from the court and reasonable opportunity to respond, award just damages and single or double costs to the appellee." "The purpose of Rule 38 damages is to compensate appellees who are forced to defend judgments awarded them in the trial court from appeals that are wholly without merit, and to 'preserve the appellate court calendar for cases worthy of consideration.' ... Another important purpose is to discourage litigants from unnecessarily wasting their opponents' time and resources." See Nagle v. Alspach, 8 Fad 141, 145 (3rd Cir. 1993).

We have imposed Rule 38 sanctions upon "appellants who raise 'clearly frivolous claims' in the face of established law and clear facts." See Farese v. Scherer, 342 F.3d 1223, 1232 (11th Cir. 2003) citing Misabec Mercantile, Inc. De Panama v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette ACLI Futures, Inc., 853 F.2d 834, 841 (11th Cir. 1988).

After review of the matters pending before us, we readily conclude that Appellant's conduct in this Court meets the requirement for imposition of Rule 38 sanctions. Therefore, Maid's Rule 38 motion is GRANTED.

Maid is DIRECTED to file a statement of costs and expenses within twenty-one (21) days of the date of this Order. Appellant's response to Maid's statement will be due within fourteen (14) days of service of Maid's statement.

FILED
U.S.COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

FEB 25 2010

THOMAS K. KAHN
CLERK

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 10-10349-A

WILLIAM M. WINDSOR,

Versus

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
JUDGE ORINDA D. EVANS, et al.,

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia

BEFORE: TJOFLAT, EDMONDSON, and BIRCH, Circuit Judges.

BY THE COURT:

This appeal is DISMISSED, *sua sponte*, for lack of jurisdiction. The district court's September 25, 2009, and October 20, 2009, orders denying William M. Windsor's motions for recusal, are neither final nor immediately appealable, as they did not dispose of his underlying action. See 28 U.S.C. §1291; CSX Transp. Inc. v. City of Garden City, 235

F.3d 1325, 1327 (11th Cir. 2000); Haney v. City of Cumming, 69 F.3d. 1098, 1101 (11th Cir. 1995).

No motion for reconsideration may be filed unless it complies with the timing and other requirements of 11th Cir.R 27-2 and all other applicable rules.

FILED
U.S.COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

MAR 17 2010

JOHN LEY
CLERK

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

Nos. 10-10698-A, 09-10699-A, 10-10700-A and 10-10701-A

IN RE:

William M. Windsor.

Petitioner.

On Petition for Writ of Mandamus to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia

---

BEFORE: BLACK, CARNES and WILSON, Circuit Judges.

BY THE COURT:

These four pro se petitions for writ of mandamus, filed by Petitioner William M. Windsor, stem from the now-closed litigation between Petitioner, his companies Alcatraz Media, LLC and Alcatraz Media, Inc. ("Alcatraz") and Respondents Maid of the Mist Corporation and Maid of the Mist Steamboat Company, Ltd. ("Maid").

On September 19, 2008, in Maid of the Mist Corporation v. Alcatraz Media, LLC, No. 07-14214, this Court affirmed the grant of summary judgment and the grant of a permanent injunction against Petitioner and Alcatraz. The Court vacated and remanded the award of attorneys' fees and expenses to Maid for reconsideration and an explanation of amount awarded.

On December 9, 2008, the District Court entered a Consent Final Order and Judgment, and the case was closed.

Despite Petitioner's consent to the Final Order and Judgment, Petitioner has continued to challenge the resolution and termination of the underlying litigation. In these four petitions, Petitioner asks this Court to compel Chief District Judge Carnes and District Judge Evans "to perform statutory duties and correct violations of Windsor's constitutional rights." Petitioner also seeks to compel District Judge Evans to unseal documents in the now-closed underlying litigation and to allow Alcatraz to proceed pro se. Petitioner also asks this Court to disqualify District Judge Evans and to vacate all orders entered in the underlying case.

We note that, in addition to these petitions, Petitioner has filed a number of appeals, several of which have been dismissed as frivolous (Nos. 09-13086 and 09-14735) or for lack of jurisdiction (10-10349), and that some five petitions for writ of mandamus previously filed by Petitioner (Nos. 09-14018, 09-15232, 09-16448, 09-16493 & 09-16494) have also been denied. Two appeals remain

pending at this time (Nos. 09-13998 and 10-10139).

As this Court pointed out in its previous mandamus orders, mandamus is appropriate only when "no other adequate means are available to remedy a clear usurpation of power or abuse of discretion" by the district court. See In re: Laudermiich, 158 F.3d 1143, 1144 (11th Cir. 1998); see also In re Bethesda Memorial Hosp., Inc., 123 F.3d 1407, 1408 (11th Cir. 1997). In addition, Petitioner has the burden of show that his right "to issuance of the writ is 'clear and indisputable.'" See In re Lopez-Lukis, 113 F.3d 1187, 1188 (11th Cir. 1997) citing Kerr v. United States District Court for the Northern District of California, 426 U.S. 394, 403, 96 S.Ct. 2119, 2124, 48 L.Ed.2d 725 (1976).

After review, we find that Petitioner has failed to carry his burden both of showing that there is no other adequate alternative remedy or that, on the merits of his petitions, he is entitled to a writ. Therefore, these petitions for writ of mandamus are DENIED.

The motion for stay pending resolution of No. 10-10701, filed in that petition, is DENIED AS MOOT.

We note that since the Consent Final Order and Judgment to which Petitioner was a party was filed with the District Court, Petitioner has filed at least thirteen appeals or mandamus petitions with this Court, which have essentially sought the same relief: to reopen the closed litigation and undo the resolution of that case.

As Petitioner has demonstrated his intention to continue to pursue efforts to re-open and re-litigate a case which was closed with his consent, we are obligated to take steps to limit the waste of judicial resources consumed by Petitioner's efforts. Accordingly, the following restrictions will apply to any future pro se appeals or mandamus petitions taken by Petitioner:

(I) Upon the docketing of any pro se notice of appeal or mandamus petition from Petitioner in any civil case, the matter shall be automatically stayed until such time as Petitioner has paid the docketing fee and the Court has determined if the matter appears to be facially frivolous.

(ii) Until and unless the Court determines that any such matter may proceed, the appeal or mandamus petition shall remain stayed, and the Clerk shall not accept any filings.

The above procedure shall only apply to matters docketed after the date of entry of this Order. In addition, both with respect to new actions and any which may be already pending, the Court retains the discretion to dismiss an appeal or to deny a mandamus petition if it appears at any time that the matter is frivolous and entirely without merit, see Eleventh Circuit Rule 42-4, and/or to impose sanctions for a frivolous appeal, see Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38, and/or to impose sanctions for filing a frivolous motion, see Eleventh Circuit Rule 27-4.

Petitioner may file a single motion for reconsideration from this order, which motion does not exceed twenty (20) pages within twenty-one (21) days of the date of this Order.

FILED
U.S.COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

APR 14 2010

JOHN LEY
CLERK

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 09-14735-DD

MAID OF THE MIST CORPORATION,
MAID OF THE MIST STEAMBOAT COMPANY, LTD.,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

Versus

WILLIAM M. WINDSOR,

Defendant-Appellant

JUDGE ORINDA D. EVANS,

Movant-Appellee.

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia

---

BEFORE: CARNES, BARKETT and HULL, Circuit Judges.

BY THE COURT:

All pending motions filed by Appellant, including Appellant's motion to vacate and for reconsideration, and any request for relief contained

in any other document filed by Appellant are DENIED.

Appellant's response to Appellees Maid of the Mist, et al. ("Maid")'s motion for Eleventh Circuit Rule 27-4 sanctions far exceeds the twenty (20) page limit of Fed.R.App.P. 27(d)(2). Therefore, we STRIKE Appellant's response and direct the Clerk to return that document unfiled.

Maid's motion for Eleventh Circuit Rule 27-4 sanctions for Appellant's filing of frivolous motions is DENIED in light of the Rule 38 sanctions that we award below. However, we note that this Order does not preclude the grant of another Rule 27-4 motion filed in any of Appellant's other appeal or petitions pending with this Court.

In compliance with the direction in our February 25, 2010, Order dismissing the appeal as frivolous and granting Rule 38 sanctions to Maid, Maid has filed a statement of its costs and expenses (including attorneys' fees). Maid seeks an award of Rule 38 sanctions in an amount of $37,401.17.

We have reviewed the declaration of maid's counsel, the records attached thereto, and Appellant's over-long response, which fails to meaningfully challenge the amounts sought by Maid.

We note that the first of Maid's billing entries is for work performed before the notice of appeal for this case was filed in the District Court. Consequently, we discount that entry for $67.50 in our determination of the amount to be awarded.

We GRANT Maid's application for Rule 38 sanctions in the form of attorneys' fees and single costs in the amount of $37,333.67.

As a final matter, we DIRECT the Clerk to accept no further filings from Appellant in this closed appeal.

FILED
U.S.COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

Apr 26 2010

JOHN LEY
CLERK

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 09-16448-A, 09-16493-A & 09-16494-A

IN RE:

WILLIAM M. WINDSOR,

Petitioner

On Petition for Writ of Mandamus to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia

---

BEFORE: CARNES, BARKETT, and HULL, Circuit Judges.

BY THE COURT:

On February 18, 2010, this Court dismissed these three petitions. Subsequent to entry of that Order, Petitioner and Respondents Maid of the Mist, et. Al., ("Maid") have filed a number of motions. We hereby DENY all pending motions filed by either Petitioner or Maid in these three petitions. The only moti0on which we will discuss here is Petitioner's motion to disqualify this Court and for transfer of his petitions to another venue.

As this Court noted in its February 25, 2010, Order dismissing Maid of the Mist Corp. v. Windsor, No. 09-14735, review of Petitioner's motion establishes that the basis of his attempt to disqualify or recuse this Court is Petitioner's belief that previous adverse rulings were the result of bias, dishonesty or some other improper motivation or intent.

We also noted that the Supreme Court stated in Liteky v. U.S., 510 U.S. 540 555,114 S.Ct. 1147, 1157 (1994), "judicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion." See also Byrne v. Nezhat, 261 F.3d 1075, 1103 (11th Cir. 2001); McWhorter v. City of Birmingham, 906 F .2d 674, 678 (11th Cir. 1990). As with the motion to disqualify filed in No. 09-14735, Petitioner's motion to disqualify and the other motions filed by the Petitioner fail to allege any valid basis for disqualification of any member of this Court. Consequently, Petitioner's motion to disqualify this Court and for transfer to another venue is without merit and is DENIED.

As these petitions have previously been dismissed and all pending motions have been resolved by this Order, the Clerk is directed to accept no further filings in these petitions.

FILED
U.S.COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

APR 27 2010

JOHN LEY
CLERK

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 10-10349-A

WILLIAM M. WINDSOR,

Versus

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
JUDGE ORINDA D. EVANS, et al.,

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia

BEFORE: TJOFLAT, EDMONDSON, and BIRCH, Circuit Judges.

BY THE COURT:

This appeal is DISMISSED, *sua sponte*, for lack of jurisdiction. The district court's September 25, 2009, and October 20, 2009, orders denying William M. Windsor's motions for recusal, are neither final nor immediately appealable, as they did not dispose of his underlying action. See 28 U.S.C. §1291; CSX Transp. Inc. v. City of Garden City, 235

F.3d 1325, 1327 (11th Cir. 2000); Haney v. City of Cumming, 69 F.3d. 1098, 1101 (11th Cir. 1995).

Appellant may file a single motion for reconsideration from this order, which must comply with the timing, page and format requirements of 11th Cir.R 27-2 and all other applicable rules.

The Clerk is directed to accept no other documents or motions from Appellant for filing this appeal except the single motion for reconsideration

FILED
U.S.COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

APR 29 2010

JOHN LEY
CLERK

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 10-11158-AA & 10-11981-AA

MAID OF THE MIST CORPORATION,
MAID OF THE MIST STEAMBOAT COMPANY, LTD.,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

Versus

WILLIAM M. WINDSOR,

Defendant-Appellant

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia

---

ORDER:

On April 14, 2010, in In Re William M. Windsor, Nos. 10-10698, 10-10699, 10-10700 and 10-10701, this Court entered a consolidated order denying Appellant's petitions for mandamus. The Order established a frivolity screening requirement for any future appeals or mandamus petitions. The Order further provided that no documents were to be filed in any appeal or mandamus petition until after the frivolity review had been undertaken.

On April 9, 2010, the District Court entered an order (Docket No. 752) and Judgment (Docket No. 753) imposing attorneys' fees against Appellant personally. On April 26, 2010, the District Court found Appellant in contempt of its December 22, 2009 order and directed Appellant to purge himself of that contempt. See Docket No. 794.

Since the April 9 attorneys' fees order was entered, Appellant has filed numerous notices of appeal. Our initial review has established that Docket Nos. 766, 780, 805, 847 and 850 are the notices of appeals included in Appeal No. 10-11758. Docket No. 808 is docketed here as Appeal No. 10-11981.

Based on an initial review of the orders encompassed by Appellant's many notices of appeal, it appears that these appeals ARE NOT FRIVOLOUS and MAY PROCEED.

The Court notes that, although these appeals have been found not frivolous in this initial review, this Order does not prevent a subsequent determination by the Court, either upon motion or sua sponte, that these appeal are frivolous as briefed or for any other reason or subsequent development. The determination in this Order is merely made to allow these appeals to proceed past this initial screening.

In light of this determination, the Clerk is directed to FILE Appellant's "Motion to Clarify Orders Appealed or Motion to Consolidate Appeals" in No. 10-11758 as of this date.

To the extent that Appellant's motion to "clarify" or to "consolidate" asks this Court to determine whether the May 4, 2010, Order denying reconsideration (Docket No. 833) is included in No. 10-11758, the Court GRANTS that motion as our initial review suggests that order is incorporated in Appellant's May 5, 2010 notice of appeal (Docket No. 850).

Although these appeals may proceed, Appellant is cautioned that he is required to strictly comply with the formatting and length requirements established in the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure for both motions and briefs. Appellant MAY NOT seek an extension of pages or words for any document filed by him in either of these appeals.

Nor may Appellant file multiple motions seeking the same relief or reconsideration of any Order of this Court. Appellant may file only a single motion seeking any type of relief and may file only a single motion for reconsideration of any Order of this Court.

/s
UNITED STATES CIRCUIT JUDGE

FILED
U.S.COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

JUN 16 2010

JOHN LEY
CLERK

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 09-14735-DD

MAID OF THE MIST CORPORATION,
MAID OF THE MIST STEAMBOAT COMPANY, LTD.,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

Versus

WILLIAM M. WINDSOR,

Defendant-Appellant

JUDGE ORINDA D. EVANS,

Movant-Appellee.

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia

---

ORDER:

Consistent with the Court's April 26, 2010, Order barring any additional filings in this closed appeal, the Clerk is directed to return unfiled the documents tendered by Appellant after entry of our Order.

The Clerk may discard any documents
tendered by Appellant after the entry of this Order.

/s/

UNITED STATES CIRCUIT JUDGE

FILED
U.S.COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

JUN 28 2010

JOHN LEY
CLERK

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 10-12515-A & 10-12516-A

MAID OF THE MIST CORPORATION,
MAID OF THE MIST STEAMBOAT COMPANY, LTD.,

Plaintiffs-Counter Defendants-Appellees,

Versus

WILLIAM M. WINDSOR,

Defendant-Counter Claimant-Appellant

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia

---

ORDER:

On April 14, 2010, in In Re William M. Windsor, Nos. 10-10698, 10-10699,10-10700 and 10-10701, this Court entered a consolidated order denying Appellant's petitions for mandamus. The Order established a frivolity screening requirement for any future appeals or mandamus petitions. The Order further provided that no documents were to be filed in any appeal or mandamus petition until after the frivolity review had been undertaken.

On April 9, 2010, the District Court entered an order (Docket No. 752) and Judgment (Docket No. 753) imposing attorneys' fees against Appellant personally. Appellant's appeal from those orders has been docketed here as No. 10-11758.

On May 4, 2010, the District Court denied Appellant's motion for reconsideration of its April 9, 2010, Order. See Docket No. 833. Appellant's appeal from that order is docketed here as No. 10-12515.

On April 30, 2010, the District Court entered an order imposing additional attorneys' fees against Appellant. See Docket Nos. 816 and 817. Appellant's appeal from that order is docketed here as No. 10-12516.

The Court notes that, although these appeals have been found not frivolous in this initial review, this Order does not prevent a subsequent determination by the Court, either upon motion or sua sponte, that these appeal are frivolous as briefed or for any other reason or subsequent development. The determination in this Order is merely made to allow these appeals to proceed past this initial screening.

Although these appeals may proceed, Appellant is cautioned that he is required to strictly comply with the formatting and length requirements established in the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure for both motions and briefs. Appellant MAY NOT seek an extension of pages or words for any document filed by him in either of these appeals.

Nor may Appellant file multiple motions seeking the same relief or reconsideration of any Order of this Court. Appellant may file only a single motion seeking any type of relief and may file only a single motion for reconsideration of any Order of this Court.

On its own motion, the Court hereby CONSOLIDATES Nos. 10-11758 and 10-12515.

/s
UNITED STATES CIRCUIT JUDGE

FILED
U.S.COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

JUN 29 2010

JOHN LEY
CLERK

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

1:06-CV-0714

No. 10-12517-A

MAID OF THE MIST CORPORATION,
MAID OF THE MIST STEAMBOAT COMPANY, LTD.,
Plaintiffs-Counter Defendants- Appellees,

Versus

WILLIAM M. WINDSOR,
Defendant-Counter Claimant-Appellant

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia

BEFORE: CARNES, HULL and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.

BY THE COURT:

On its own motion, the Court hereby DISMISSES this appeal AS FRIVOLOUS pursuant to Eleventh Circuit Rule 42-4.

Pursuant to Fed.R.App.P.2, we hereby SUSPEND any rule which would allow Appellant to

seek reconsideration of this Order. Appellant is prohibited from any further filings in this closed appeal.

The Clerk is directed to accept no further filings in this appeal and may discard any documents tendered by Appellant.

FILED
U.S.COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

JUL 12 2010

JOHN LEY
CLERK

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 10-12450-A

MAID OF THE MIST CORPORATION,
MAID OF THE MIST STEAMBOAT COMPANY, LTD.,

Plaintiffs-Counter Defendants-Appellees,

Versus

WILLIAM M. WINDSOR,

Defendant-Counter Claimant-Appellant

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia

---

BEFORE: EDMONDSON, BIRCH and WILSON, Circuit Judges.

BY THE COURT:

On its own motion, the Court hereby DISMISSES this appeal AS FRIVOLOUS pursuant to Eleventh Circuit Rule 42-4.

Pursuant to Fed.R.App.P.2, we hereby SUSPEND any rule which would allow Appellant to seek reconsideration of this Order. Appellant is

prohibited from any further filings in this closed appeal.

The Clerk is directed to accept no further filings in this appeal and may discard any documents tendered by Appellant.

FILED
U.S.COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

JUL 14 2010

JOHN LEY
CLERK

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 10-11981-A

MAID OF THE MIST CORPORATION,
MAID OF THE MIST STEAMBOAT COMPANY, LTD.,

Plaintiffs-Counter Defendants- Appellees,

Versus

WILLIAM M. WINDSOR,

Defendant-Counter Claimant-Appellant

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia

---

BEFORE: BIRCH and BLACK, Circuit Judges.

BY THE COURT:

Appellant's motion for reconsideration of this Court's June 30, 2010, Order construing Appellant's "Notice of Filing of Withdrawal of Notice of Appeal," as a motion to dismiss this appeal with prejudice and granting that motion, is GRANTED to the extent that this appeal is hereby REINSTATED.

The Clerk is directed to issue a briefing schedule in this appeal at the appropriate time.

FILED
U.S.COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

JUL 26 2010

JOHN LEY
CLERK

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 10-10139-AA

MAID OF THE MIST CORPORATION,
MAID OF THE MIST STEAMBOAT COMPANY, LTD.,

Plaintiffs-Counter Defendants- Appellees,

Versus

WILLIAM M. WINDSOR,

Defendant-Counter Claimant-Appellant

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia

---

BEFORE: DUBINA, Chief Judge, PRYOR and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

BY THE COURT:

Appellant's motion for an extension until October 1, 2010, to file a petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc is GRANTED IN PART to the extent that Appellant's rehearing petition will be due within fourteen (14) days of the date of this Order.

Appellant's motion to publish the opinion issued in this appeal is DENIED.

FILED
U.S.COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

SEP 13 2010

JOHN LEY
CLERK

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, TREATISES, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, AND REGULATIONS

28 U.S.C. § 144 Bias or prejudice of judge

Whenever a party to any proceeding in a district court makes and files a timely and sufficient affidavit that the judge before whom the matter is pending has a personal bias or prejudice either against him or in favor of any adverse party, such judge shall proceed no further therein, but another judge shall be assigned to hear such proceeding.

The affidavit shall state the facts and the reasons for the belief that bias or prejudice exists, and shall be filed not less than ten days before the beginning of the term at which the proceeding is to be heard, or good cause shall be shown for failure to file it within such time. A party may file only one such affidavit in any case. It shall be accompanied by a certificate of counsel of record stating that it is made in good faith

28 U.S.C. § 455 Disqualification of justice, judge, or magistrate judge

(a) Any justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.

(b) He shall also disqualify himself in the following circumstances:

(1) Where he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding;

(2) Where in private practice he served as lawyer in the matter in controversy, or a lawyer with whom he previously practiced law served during such association as a lawyer concerning the matter, or the judge or such lawyer has been a material witness concerning it;

(3) Where he has served in governmental employment and in such capacity participated as counsel, adviser or material witness concerning the proceeding or expressed an opinion concerning the merits of the particular case in controversy;

(4) He knows that he, individually or as a fiduciary, or his spouse or minor child residing in his household, has a financial interest in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or any other interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding;

(5) He or his spouse, or a person within the third degree of relationship to either of them, or the spouse of such a person:

(i) Is a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director, or trustee of a party;

(ii) Is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding;

(iii) Is known by the judge to have an interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding;

(iv) Is to the judge's knowledge likely to be a material witness in the proceeding.

(c) A judge should inform himself about his personal and fiduciary financial interests, and make a reasonable effort to inform himself about the personal financial interests of his spouse and minor children residing in his household.

(d) For the purposes of this section the following words or phrases shall have the meaning indicated:

(1) "proceeding" includes pretrial, trial, appellate review, or other stages of litigation;

(2) the degree of relationship is calculated according to the civil law system;

(3) "fiduciary" includes such relationships as executor, administrator, trustee, and guardian;

(4) "financial interest" means ownership of a legal or equitable interest, however small, or a relationship as director, adviser, or other active participant in the affairs of a party, except that:

(i) Ownership in a mutual or common investment fund that holds securities is not a "financial interest" in such securities unless the judge participates in the management of the fund;

(ii) An office in an educational, religious, charitable, fraternal, or civic organization is not a "financial interest" in securities held by the organization;

(iii) The proprietary interest of a policyholder in a mutual insurance company, of a depositor in a mutual savings association, or a similar proprietary interest, is a "financial interest" in the organization only if the outcome of the proceeding could substantially affect the value of the interest;

(iv) Ownership of government securities is a "financial interest" in the issuer only if the outcome of the proceeding could substantially affect the value of the securities.

(e) No justice, judge, or magistrate judge shall accept from the parties to the proceeding a waiver of any ground for disqualification enumerated in subsection (b). Where the ground for disqualification arises only under subsection (a), waiver may be accepted provided it is preceded by a full disclosure on the record of the basis for disqualification.

(f) Notwithstanding the preceding provisions of this section, if any justice, judge, magistrate judge, or bankruptcy judge to whom a matter has been assigned would be disqualified, after substantial judicial time has been devoted to the matter, because of the appearance or discovery, after the matter was assigned to him or her, that he or she individually or as a fiduciary, or his or her spouse or minor child residing in his or her household, has a financial interest in a party (other than an interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome),

disqualification is not required if the justice, judge, magistrate judge, bankruptcy judge, spouse or minor child, as the case may be, divests himself or herself of the interest that provides the grounds for the disqualification.

Constitution of the United States – Article VI:

All Debts contracted and Engagements entered into, before the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be as valid against the United States under this Constitution, as under the Confederation.
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the Members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers, both of the United States and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution; but no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States.

Constitution of the United States – First Amendment:

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech,

or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.

Constitution of the United States – Fifth Amendment:

No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.

Constitution of the United States – Sixth Amendment:

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district where in the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.

Constitution of the United States – Eighth Amendment:

Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.

Constitution of the United States – Ninth Amendment:

The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.

Constitution of the United States – Fourteenth Amendment:

Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

Section 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for President and Vice President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial officers of a

State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.

Section 3. No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability.

Section 4. The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations and claims shall be held illegal and void.

Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.

(3)

Supreme Court, U.S.
FILED
FEB - 4 2011
OFFICE OF THE CLERK

No. 10-633

In The
Supreme Court of the United States

In re WILLIAM M. WINDSOR

WILLIAM M. WINDSOR,
Petitioner

v.

Judge Joel F. Dubina, Judge Rosemary Barkett, Judge Edward Earl Carnes, Judge James Larry Edmondson, Judge Frank M. Hull, Judge Stanley Marcus, Judge William H. Pryor, Jr., Judge Gerald Bard Tjoflat, Judge Beverly B. Martin, Judge Susan H. Black, Judge Charles R. Wilson, Judge James C. Hill, Judge Peter T. Fay, Judge Phyllis A. Kravitch, Judge R. Lanier Anderson, and Judge Emmett Ripley Cox,
Respondents

On Petition for Writ of Mandamus

To The United States Court of Appeals for The Eleventh Circuit

PETITION FOR REHEARING

William M. Windsor
Pro Se
PO Box 681236,
Marietta, GA 30068
770-578-1094

Petitioner William M. Windsor ("Windsor" or "Petitioner") hereby files this Petition for Rehearing pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 44.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

1. From March 2006 to the present, federal judges have acted in a corrupt manner and have committed a variety of felonies to damage Windsor.

2. On November 5, 2010, the Petition for Writ of Mandamus was filed with this Court.

3. On January 18, 2011, the Supreme Court Docket online indicates that the Petition for Writ of Mandamus was denied. Windsor received an alleged "order" that is nothing but a letter.

ARGUMENTS AND AUTHORITY

4. Windsor seeks to have this Court rehear this Petition for substantial grounds not previously presented.

THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT HAVE VIOLATED THEIR OATHS OF OFFICE IN DENYING THIS PETITION.

5. The justices of The United States Supreme Court have violated their oaths of office in denying this Petition.

6. The Supreme Court web site provides the oaths of office that are required: http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/oath/textoftheoathsofoffice2009.aspx.

7. 5 U.S.C.§3331 provides the oath that is now taken by all federal employees, including members of the Supreme Court:

> "I, _____, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter. So help me God."

8. The Judicial Oath, found at 28 U.S.C.§453, is also taken by each justice of the Supreme Court:

> "I, _____, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will administer justice without respect to persons, and do equal right to the poor and to the rich, and that I will faithfully and impartially discharge and perform all the duties incumbent upon me as _____ under the Constitution and laws of the United States. So help me God."

9. The questions presented to this Court

in this Petition for Writ of Certiorari were:

> "There is no legal or factual basis whatsoever for the decisions of the lower courts in this matter. These rulings were issued for corrupt reasons. Many of the judges in the Northern District of Georgia and the Eleventh Circuit are corrupt and violate laws and rules, as they have done in this case. Then Supreme Court must recognize this Petition as one of the most serious matters ever presented to this Court.
>
> "The key questions are:
>
> 1. Whether federal courts must be stopped from operating corruptly and ignoring all laws, rules, and facts.
>
> 2. Whether the Supreme Court is prepared to declare the Constitution and its amendments null and void."

10. The information presented to this Court included the following:

> "The citizens of the United States expect and deserve a fair trial. They expect and deserve honesty and fairness from judges. They believe courts issue carefully-considered opinions that explain why their decisions are justified. Citizens do not expect that one party can lie continually in court and get away with it. Citizens do not expect that judges may violate the rules and criminal statutes as

part of a scheme to cheat a litigant. This is precisely what is happening in this case.

"The Constitution allegedly guarantees citizens a fair and impartial judge. The Eleventh Circuit and the Northern District of Georgia have not protected this guarantee. (***Liteky v U.S.***, 510 US 540 (1994). They have completely and totally disregarded this guarantee.

"Currently, no citizen can feel that there is anything but corruption in the federal courts in Atlanta, Georgia. The Supreme Court is the only hope to rectify this as all government officials have ignored the issue.

"There is NOTHING whatsoever right with any of the decisions of the district courts and the Eleventh Circuit in this and related matters. The facts are that Windsor has always been totally in the right. The law provides that Windsor should have always prevailed on every meaningful issue. These judges have knowingly violated the law and the rules to protect Judge Orinda D. Evans from criminal prosecution and impeachment. There is nothing legally, ethically, or morally right about what these judges have done.

"For all the above reasons, the Petitioner now respectfully prays that this Court grant a Writ for Certiorari to review the judgment and opinions of the Eleventh Circuit.

> "This Court should ask the House and Senate Judiciary Committees to investigate the federal judiciary in Atlanta.
>
> "This Court should remand this matter to a different circuit where Windsor's Constitutional rights might be honored."

11. This Court was therefore well aware of criminal charges of felonies against this federal judge in Atlanta and serious violations of Constitutional rights. And the justices of The Supreme Court ignored it.

12. Windsor's Petition was unopposed, so Windsor's claims were uncontroverted. But the justices of The Supreme Court ignored it.

13. The oaths of office taken require each justice to "defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic" and "bear true faith and allegiance to the same...." The justices of The Supreme Court have failed to defend the Constitution against a domestic enemy – the federal judges in Atlanta, Georgia. By refusing to address this Petition, the justices of The Supreme Court have allowed federal courts to operate corruptly and ignore all laws, rules, and facts. The justices of The Supreme Court are allowing federal judges to treat the Constitution and the Bill of Rights as if they are null and void. The justices of The Supreme Court have failed to defend the Constitution.

14. This error must be corrected by having

this Court rehear the Petition. This Court has no choice but to defend the Constitution by granting the Petition.

THE CLERK OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT HAS VIOLATED THE LAW, THE RULES, AND WINDSOR'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS BY FAILING TO FILE PROPERLY PRESENTED MOTIONS.

15. Windsor submitted a proper motion to the Clerk that will provide documentary proof of the fraud and illegal acts of the judges, but the Clerk did not file the motion, did not indicate to Windsor that there was any problem with the motion, and the motion was not properly considered.

THE ORDER DENYING THIS PETITION VIOLATES 28 U.S.C.§1691. IT DOES NOT CONTAIN THE SEAL OF THE COURT OR THE SIGNATURE OF A CLERK WITH THE NECESSARY CREDENTIALS.

16. The so-called order denying this Petition is a letter, not an order, and it does not bear the seal of the clerk.

17. 28 U.S.C.§1691 requires: "All writs and process issuing from a court of the United States shall be under the seal of the court and signed by the clerk thereof." The Order is invalid, so the Petition must be reheard.

18. The word "process" at 28 U.S.C. 1691 means a court order. See ***Middleton Paper Co. v. Rock***

River Paper Co., 19 F. 252 (C.C. W.D. Wisconsin 1884); *Taylor v. U.S.*, 45 F. 531 (C.C. E.D. Tennessee 1891); *U.S. v. Murphy*, 82 F. 893 (DCUS Delaware 1897); *Leas & McVitty v. Merriman*, 132 F. 510 (C.C. W.D. Virginia 1904); *U.S. v. Sharrock*, 276 F. 30 (DCUS Montana 1921); In re Simon, 297 F. 942, 34 ALR 1404 (2nd Cir. 1924); *Scanbe Mfg. Co. v. Tryon*, 400 F.2d 598 (9th Cir. 1968); and *Miles v. Gussin*, 104 B.R. 553 (Bankruptcy D.C. 1989).

THIS COURT DID NOT HAVE A QUORUM TO VOTE ON WINDSOR'S PETITION AS DOCUMENTATION REQUIRED TO BE MAINTAINED BY THIS COURT IS INCOMPLETE.

19. Upon information and belief, the documentation required for justices is not complete.

20. Upon information and belief, required credentials documentation is not filed as required for justices Roberts, Thomas, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Alito. It is also possible that credentials are missing for recently appointed judges.

21. 5 U.S.C.§2906 reads as follows:

> The oath of office taken by an individual under section 3331 of this title shall be delivered by him to, and preserved by, the

House of Congress, agency, or court to which the office pertains.

22. If the Supreme Court does not have the necessary credentials on file, these justices do not have the right to rule on any matters. If there was not a quorum, the "order" denying the Petition is invalid. Windsor demands to see the credentials that were on file.

23. Upon information and belief, the required credentials are missing for William K. Suter dba "Clerk of Court."

24. If this is correct, any "orders" signed by Mr. Suter is invalid as he did not have the legal credentials filed that are required.

THIS COURT VIOLATED ARTICLE III SECTION 2 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES.

25. Article III Section 2 of the Constitution provides: "The judicial power shall extend to all cases, in law and equity, arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority...."

26. This Court's judicial power is dependent upon the Constitution, yet this Court ignored the Constitution in denying Windsor's Petition.

27. Windsor submits that this Court has no authority or right to ignore claims of the

violation of Constitutional rights that are presented to this Court. The Constitution makes it very clear that it and only it provides judicial power. Therefore, any court that knowingly allows violations of the Constitution has no power and is functioning without jurisdiction.

28. This Court must grant the petition and declare that Windsor's Constitutional rights have been violated. Failure to do so must be considered a violation of the Constitution by the justices of this Court.

THIS COURT IGNORED THE CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS THAT EXISTS IN THE UNITED STATES.

29. Federal judges have turned the United States into a police state in which they wield tyrannical power, intentionally violating the Constitution, laws, rules, and their oath.

30. The most basic so-called "guarantees" of the Constitution have been stolen from us by corrupt federal judges. We might as well be living in a Communist country where we have been shocked to hear of the violation of the rights of the citizens. It has become just as bad in the United States when this is allowed to happen and no one will do anything about it.

31. The Supreme Court is the only hope for

anyone to do anything about this, and it is The Supreme Court's primary legal obligation to ensure that the Constitution is not being violated by federal judges.

THIS COURT VIOLATED ITS OWN LAW BY FAILING TO PROVIDE AN EXPLANATION OF ANY SORT IN THE ORDER DENYING THE PETITION.

32. In 2009, this Court issued an order requiring federal courts to issue orders with an explanation.

> "...courts err in disposing of claims without explanation of any sort." (***Corcoran v. Levenhagen***, 558 U.S. ___ (2009), (08-10495).)

33. This Court violated its own law by issuing a one-word decision.

34. This Court has an obligation to the citizens of the United States.

THE JUSTICES OF THIS COURT AND ALL WHO READ THE PETITION HAVE A LEGAL OBLIGATION UNDER 18 U.S.C.§4 TO REPORT FELONIES.

35. 18 U.S.C.§4 states that:

> "Whoever, having knowledge of the actual commission of a felony cognizable by a court of the United States, conceals and does not as soon as possible make known the same to

some judge or other person in civil or military authority under the United States, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than three years, or both."

36. Windsor has provided proof of felonies to this Court. Therefore, each of the justices of The Supreme Court has a legal obligation to report these crimes to law enforcement authorities. Each of the clerks and the approximately 40 people who were supposed to read the Petition also have the same legal obligation. This Court must do as Windsor asked and refer this matter to a Grand Jury in Atlanta, Georgia.

37. Windsor asks the 40 people receiving this Petition for Rehearing to report these crimes. If this is not done, Windsor intends to file charges against each of the justices and the 40 recipients for violation of 18 U.S.C.§4, and a verified complaint pursuant to Bivens, RICO, and more.

38. Judge Orinda D. Evans has committed the following crimes:

RICO; Theft by Deception -- O.C.G.A. 16-8-3; False Statements to State – Violation of O.C.G.A. 16-10-20; Tampering with Evidence – O.C.G.A. 16-10-94; Mail Fraud – Violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341; False Swearing – Making False Statements – Violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001; Perjury – Violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1621, 18 U.S.C. § 1623, AND O.C.G.A. 16-10-70; Conspiracy to Defraud United States -- 18 U.S.C. §

371; Obstruction of Justice and Witness Tampering -- 18 U.S.C. § 1503; Subornation of Perjury – Violation of 18 USC § 1622, O.C.G.A. 16-10-72, and O.C.G.A. 16-10-93; Witness Tampering – Violation of O.C.G.A. 16-10-93.

39. Judge William S. Duffey, Jr. has committed the following crimes: RICO; Tampering with Evidence – O.C.G.A. 16-10-94; Mail Fraud – Violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341; False Swearing – Making False Statements – Violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001; Perjury – Violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1621, 18 U.S.C. § 1623, AND O.C.G.A. 16-10-70; Conspiracy to Defraud United States -- 18 U.S.C. § 371; Obstruction of Justice and Witness Tampering -- 18 U.S.C. § 1503; Subornation of Perjury – Violation of 18 USC § 1622, O.C.G.A. 16-10-72, and O.C.G.A. 16-10-93; Witness Tampering – Violation of O.C.G.A. 16-10-93.

40. Judges of the Eleventh Circuit have committed the following crimes:

RICO; Theft by Deception -- O.C.G.A. 16-8-3; Mail Fraud – Violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341; False Swearing – Making False Statements – Violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001; Perjury – Violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1621, 18 U.S.C. § 1623, AND O.C.G.A. 16-10-70; Conspiracy to Defraud United States -- 18 U.S.C. § 371; Obstruction of Justice -- 18 U.S.C. § 1503; Subornation of Perjury – Violation of 18 USC § 1622, O.C.G.A. 16-10-72, and O.C.G.A. 16-10-93.

41. Proof of these crimes is detailed in the

Dockets in Civil Action 1:06-CV-0714-ODE, 1:09-CV-01543-WSD, and 1:09-CV-02027-WSD, and in Supreme Court Actions Nos. 10-411, 10-632, 10-633, and 10-690.

THIS COURT HAS AN OBLIGATION TO START CLEANING UP AMERICA

42. If this Court is not aware that our judicial system is corrupt, shame on you. If this Court is aware that our judicial system is corrupt and has done nothing about it, shame on you.

43. Atlanta's federal courts are filled with corruption. Windsor presents the following arguments in first person:

44. I always knew there were problems with our legal system, but I thought it was just unscrupulous lawyers. I never dreamed that federal judges were corrupt and routinely commit crimes, but they do.

45. I have charged nine federal judges in Atlanta with corruption and dishonesty, and I now need to add to that list. From my personal experience, these judges ignore the law, ignore the facts, and commit criminal acts while hiding behind their judicial robes and the "judicial immunity" that the judges have given themselves over the years. These judges don't make mistakes; they do all of this intentionally.

46. I hope this is limited to Atlanta, but I fear that it is widespread in the federal judiciary in America. From my experiences here, the federal judges do whatever the heck they want to do. I do not have any proof that judges have been bribed, but the thought comes to mind. With Atlanta federal District Court Judge Orinda D. Evans, I have learned that she is evil. She has a reputation that she will twist the law and the facts to decide however she wants to decide. I have seen the darkest of her sides. She is truly an evil woman.

47. In the history of the United States, only nine federal judges have been impeached. Atlanta could top that in one fell swoop.

48. Judges are supposed to tell the truth at all times, but these judges have made false statements routinely. These were material false statements made under the judges' oath of office in a federal proceeding. These judges knew statements that they made were false.

49. Judges are supposed to provide due process to the parties in their courts, but I have had just about every form of due process denied. I have not been allowed to present evidence, call witnesses, cross examine witnesses, have an impartial judge, and much more. The latest outrage is that Judge Evans and Judge Duffey have intercepted lawsuits that I filed against them. They got the Clerk of the Court to refuse to enter them on the docket, and then a month later, Judge Evans

issued an injunction against me that stops me from filing any lawsuits. The injunction was issued without notice or the opportunity to be heard.

50. These judges routinely ignored the facts and the law and even invented their own facts. These judges have made rulings that are absolutely contrary to the law.

51. I have three grandchildren - Madison, Mackenzie, and Katherine. I drive Madison's carpool once a week. She is unbelievably intelligent and worldly for a seven-year-old. As we drove home one day, she told me they were studying Martin Luther King. She asked me to tell her about those times, so I did. She asked me what I did to stop the prejudice and all the problems. I told her that I was never prejudiced, but I didn't really do anything. She asked if I had ever done anything that made a big difference in the world. I said, no, unfortunately not. She quickly assured me that she would make a difference in the world. I absolutely believe that is true. Well, I hope I can do something vitally important to every American with my efforts to expose corruption in the federal courts. We are all in trouble. Madison and I want to help.

52. I want to assure each of the justices of The United States Supreme Court that if you deny my Petition again, I will expose you to the world. I will seek your impeachment. I will


file a civil suit against you. I will file criminal charges against you, and I won't stop for as long as I live.

53. For Heaven's sake, do what is right. End the judicial corruption before it ends America.

WHEREFORE, Windsor requests that the Court order as follows:

(1) grant WILLIAM M. WINDSOR'S PETITION FOR REHEARING;
(2) grant WILLIAM M. WINDSOR'S PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS; and
(3) grant such other and further relief as justice requires.

Respectfully submitted, this 4 day of February, 2011.



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